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Since 1990, four state supreme courts have interpreted 
their state constitutions to provide greater protection for 
religious exercise than is available under the Federal 
Constitution.' Prompting this interpretive independence was 
the United States Supreme Court's decision in Employment 
Division v. Smith: a decision that has been widely criticized 
as the virtual repeal of the Free Exercise Clause of the First 
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many helpful comments on earlier drafts of this article. Special thanks are given to 
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providing research support. Jodi Friend, Sandra Helewa and James Tonrey deserve 
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1. See infra notes 21-38, 161-187 and accompanying text. 
2. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). See infra notes 12-13 and accompanying text. 
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A~nendment.~ 
In this article, I attempt to sketch the contours of an 
emerging post-Smith jurisprudence of state constitutions in 
light of both prior state interpretation and the "new judicial 
federalism.'" I also urge state courts to reject Smith in order to 
attain three important goals: fwst, to ensure the immediate 
protection of religious exercise within each state; second, to 
promote a dialogue among state courts and between state 
courts and the Supreme Court on the meaning of religious 
1ibe1-t~;~ and third, to encourage the development of coherent 
interpretations of the relationship of religious exercise to 
di~establishment.~ Smith has ushered in a period of crisis in 
which a fundamental national value-religious liberty-has 
lost its substantive meaning.' While we may be reluctant to 
encourage multiple state standards of protection: shifting 
interpretive activity to the states may produce a more robust 
understanding of religious liberty, and ultimately serve to 
reinvigorate federal free exercise jurisprudence. 
3. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof. . . ." U.S. CONST. amend. I (commonly 
referred to as the Religion Clauses, or separately, as the Establishment Clause and 
the Free Exercise Clause). 
4. See infia notes 43-48 and accompanying text. 
5 .  For a discussion of the role of state constitutional interpretation in dialogue 
with federal constitutional interpretation, see generally G. ALAN TARR & MARY C.A. 
PORTER, STATE SUPREME COURTS IN STATE AND NATION (1988); William J. 
B r e ~ a n ,  Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. 
L. REV. 489 (1977). 
6. G. Alan Tarr, Church and State in the States, 64 WASH. L. REV. 73, 78 
(1989). 
7. Mary Ann Glendon & Raul F. Yanes, Structural Free Exercise, 90 MICH. L. 
REV. 477, 536-37 (1991). Glendon and Yanes criticize the federal interpretive 
process for failing to "code] to grips with basic questions about the meaning and 
purpose of the Religion Clause in the light of text and tradition." Id. at 549. 
Religious exercise is protected through a "complex interplay of free exercise, free 
speech and equal protection." Id. When state constitutions are added to the 
interpretive &-independently and in dialogue with the federal 
process-additional texts and traditions, and thus additional meanings are brought 
to the discussion, and a richer interplay of provisions and narratives result. The 
success of such an interpretive project depends upon comprehensive treatment; a 
dialogue over the meaning of religious liberty must include a comprehensive 
treatment of the "relations within and among texts." Id. at 537. 
8. To the extent I once found independent state constitutional interpretation 
troubling, I have changed my mind. Cfi Angela C. Carmella, Houses of Worship 
and Religious Liberty: Constitutional Limits to Landmark Preservation and 
Architectural Review, 36 VIU. L. REV. 401, 477 (1991). 
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The Supreme Court, in its 1963 decision in Sherbert u. 
Verner, ruled that state regulation that indirectly restrains or 
punishes religious belief or conduct must be subjected to strict 
scrutiny under the Free Exercise Clause of the First 
Amend~nent.~ The Court in Sherbert and in subsequent cases 
held that when government action burdens, even inadvertently, 
a sincerely held religious belief or practice, the state must 
justify the burden by demonstrating that the law embodies a 
compelling interest, that no less restrictive alternative exists, 
and that a religious exemption would impair the state's ability 
to effectuate its compelling interest.'' As in other instances of 
state action affecting fundamental rights, negative impacts on 
those rights demand the highest level of judicial scmtiny." 
After Sherbert, this strict scrutiny balancing test resulted in 
court-mandated religious exemptions from facially neutral laws 
of general application whenever unjustified burdens were 
found. 
But Sherbert's analytical framework was discarded in 1990 
when the Court decided Employment Division v. Smith.12 
With a sweeping opinion that overturned settled law, the Court 
abandoned the strict scrutiny standard of judicial review in all 
but a few categories of free exercise cases.13 According to 
9. 374 U.S. 398, 402-10 (1963). The strict scrutiny standard of judicial review 
replaced the minimum rationality standard. In this case, Adele Sherbert, a 
Seventh-day Adventist, was denied unemployment compensation because she would 
not take a job that required work on Saturday, her Sabbath. The Supreme Court 
held that a burden on religious practice had to be justified by a compelling state 
interest. With respect to Sherbert, the state's interest was not considered 
sufficiently compelling, and so the state was required to pay Mrs. Sherbert 
unemployment compensation. Id. 
10. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
11. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 474 (1965) (state cannot 
criminalize use of contraception); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (state 
cannot sterilize some criminals and imprison others). 
12. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). Plaintiffs were discharged from their jobs with a 
private drug counseling organization because they ingested peyote in a religious 
ceremony of the Native American Church. The Supreme Court determined that the 
State's prohibition of ritual peyote use under generally applicable and facially 
neutral law was constitutional. Thus, since dismissal resulted from peyote use, the 
State's denial of unemployment compensation was likewise constitutional. 
13. Smith, 494 U.S. at  876-82, 885. Smith leaves some room for a higher 
standard of review. In cases of individualized assessment (where exemptions are 
granted on a case-by-case basis) and in cases of hybrid rights (where free exercise 
together with some other constitutional right, such as free speech or association, is 
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Smith, a generally applicable, facially neutral law cannot 
violate the Free Exercise Clause, no matter how great a burden 
to religious exercise, and no matter how insignificant the 
state's interest. To be constitutionally suspect, a law must 
target religion. Thus, a bright-line test has been chosen over 
Sherbert's balancing test; a minimum rationality standard of 
judicial review has replaced strict scrutiny; and any general 
law that is formally neutral satisfies the minimum rationality 
test.14 Legislative exemptions are acceptable, but the 
opportunity for courts to mandate religious exemptions under 
the U.S. Constitution is severely limited. Not surprisingly, a 
tremendous amount of scholarly criticism has emerged 
following the Smith decision.15 
Smith is dangerous precedent because it subordinates 
fundamental rights of religious belief and ,practice to all 
neutral, general legislation. Sherbert recognized the need to 
protect religious exercise in light of the massive increase in the 
size of government, the concerns within its reach, and the 
number of laws administered by it. However, Smith abandons 
the protection of religious exercise a t  a time when the scope 
and reach of government has never been greater. Professor 
Douglas Laycock points out that Smith creates the legal 
framework for persecution: through general, neutral laws, 
legislatures are now able to force -conformity on religious 
minorities whose practices irritate or frighten an intolerant 
majority.16 But there need not be actual animus in such 
general laws for the implications of Smith to cause alarm: 
Smith also creates the framework for ignoring religious persons 
and groups, and for crushing religious exercise and doctrinal 
development under the weight of general and neutral laws. By 
permitting the state to ignore an  entire dimension of human 
activity and meaning, Smith has made the state's political 
processes the unwitting, yet final arbiter of permissible 
religious conduct.17 
implicated), strict scrutiny will continue to be employed. Id. at 881-82, 884. 
14. See Michael W. McCo~el l ,  Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith 
Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1109, 1128 (1990). 
15. See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, Summary and Synthesis: The Crisis in Religious 
Liberty, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 841 (1992) [hereinafter Laycock, Summary]; 
Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free Ezercise, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 1 [hereinafter 
Laycock, Remnants]; McCo~e l l ,  supra note 14. 
16. Laycock, Remnants, supra note 15, at 54. 
17. See generally Angela C. Carmella, The Religion Clauses and Acculturated 
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Scholars initially thought that the categories left open in 
Smith for continued application of strict scrutiny might be 
interpreted vigorously by the lower federal courts as a way to 
avoid Smith's harsh result. Instead, there has been steady use 
of the new bright-line test of facial neutrality and general 
applicability.18 Another proposal for avoiding Smith's harsh 
result is the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, now pending 
before Congress.lS This federal law, if passed, would create a 
statutory cause of action for claimants whose religious exercise 
is burdened and would require the government to demonstrate 
a compelling interest and no less restrictive alternative. 
Another route to  the "restoration" of strict scrutiny 
protection for religious exercise cases is state constitutional 
interpretation. In fact, since Smith was decided, state courts 
have been quite active: while the high courts of Oregon and 
Vermont have expressly followed Smith's lower standard,zO 
the supreme courts of Minnesota, Maine, Massachusetts, and 
Washington have instead found an independent basis for the 
strict scrutiny standard in their state  constitution^.^' 
Religious Conduct: Boundaries for the Regulation of Religion, in THE ROLE OF 
GOVERNMENT IN MONITORING AND REGULATING RELIGION IN PUBLIC LIFE (James E. 
Wood, Jr. ed., 1993). 
18. See Ryan v. United States Dep't of Justice, 950 F.2d 458 (7th Cir. 1991), 
cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 2309 (1992); Living Faith, Inc. v. Commissioner, 950 F.2d 
365 (7th Cir. 1991); American Friends Sew. Comm. Corp. v. Thornburgh, 941 F.2d 
808 (9th Cir. 1991); St. Bartholomew's Church v. City of New York, 914 F.2d 348 
(2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1103 (1991); Munn v. Algee, 924 F.2d 568 
(5th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 277 (1991); Vandiver v. Hardin County Bd. 
of Educ., 925 F.2d 927 (6th Cir. 1991); Salvation Army v. Department of 
Community Affairs, 919 F.2d 183 (3d Cir. 1990); Church of Scientology Flag Servs. 
Org. Inc. v. City of Clearwater, 756 F. Supp. 1498 (M.D. Fla. 1991); United States 
v. Philadelphia Yearly Meeting of Religious Soc'y of Friends, 753 F. Supp. 1300 
(ED. Pa. 1990); Montgomery v. County of Clinton, 743 F. Supp. 1253 W.D. Mich. 
1990), affd, 940. F.2d 661 (6th Cir. 1991); Yang v. Sturner, 728 F. Supp. 845, 
withdrawn, 750 F. Supp. 558 (D.R.I. 1990); see also People ex rel. Meyer v. 
LaPorte Church of Christ, 830 P.2d 1150 (Colo. Ct. App. 1992); Health Servs. Div. 
v. Temple Baptist Church, 814 P.2d 130 (NM. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 814 P.2d 103 
(N-M. 1991). 
19. H.R. 1308 & S. 578, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). The bill passed the 
House on May 11, 1993, 139 CONG. REC. H.356-63 (daily ed. May 11, 1993), and 
it was approved by the Senate Judiciary Committee on May 6, 1993 by a vote of 
15 to 1, 139 CONG. REC. D472 (daily ed. May 6, 1993); Adam Clymer, Congress 
Moves to Ease Curb on Religious Acts, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 1993, a t  A9. 
20. See infia notes 153-156 and accompanying text. 
21. Rupert v. City of Portland, 605 A.2d 63 (Me. 1992); Society of Jesus v. 
Boston Landmarks Comm'n, 564 N.E.2d 571 (Mass. 1990); State v. Hershberger, 
462 N.W.2d 393 (Minn. 1990); Cooper v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2 (Mim. 1990); First 
Covenant Church v. City of Seattle, 840 P.2d 174 (Wash. 1992). 
280 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I993 
Presently, the Supreme Court of California has pending before 
it a case in which it will decide whether its own constitution 
requires the Sherbert standard.22 In addition, a proposal to  
amend the Utah Constitution is currently being debated which 
would explicitly constitutionalize the compelling interest test of 
Sherbert.23 
The state supreme courts of Minnesota, Maine, 
Massachusetts, and Washington, which currently require strict 
scrutiny, have all based their departures from Smith on their 
own states' constitutional language. Unlike the religion clauses 
of the First Amendment, the texts of these four state 
constitutions are very detailed. Each contains statements about 
the right to religious exercise, but in each constitution such a 
right is qualified by a "proviso," that is, a statement of the 
government interests capable of infringing on the protected 
religious exercise. Minnesota and Washington have identical 
provisos: "the liberty of conscience hereby secured shall not be 
construed as to excuse acts of licentiousness or justify practices 
inconsistent with the peace and safety of the state."24 Maine 
and Massachusetts have a similar proviso which allows for the 
22. Donahue v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 32 (Ct. 
App. 1991), reh'g granted & opinion superseded, 825 P.2d 766 (1992). 
23. Utah Senate Joint Resolution 8 passed the Senate and was narrowly 
defeated in the Utah House; however, it will be reconsidered next year. There was 
no genuine controversy over the compelling state interest provision of the proposed 
constitutional amendment. 
24. The M i ~ e s o t a  Constitution reads as follows: 
The right of every man to worship God according to the dictates of his 
own conscience shall never be infringed; nor shall any man be compelled 
to attend, erect or support any place of worship, or to maintain any 
religious or ecclesiastical ministry, against his consent; nor shall any 
control of or interference with the rights of conscience be permitted, or 
any preference be given by law to any religious establishment or mode of 
worship; but the liberty of conscience hereby secured shall not be so 
construed as to excuse acts of licentiousness or justify practices inconsistent 
with the peace or safety of the state, nor shall any money be drawn from 
the treasury for the benefit of any religious societies or religious or 
theological seminaries. 
MINN. CONST. art. I, 8 16 (emphasis added). The Washington State Constitution 
reads as follows: 
Absolute freedom of conscience in all matters of religious sentiment, 
belief, and worship, shall be guaranteed to every individual, and no one 
shall be molested or disturbed in person or property on account of 
religion; but the liberty of conscience hereby secured shall not be so 
construed as to excuse acts of licentiousness or justify practices inconsistent 
with the peace and safety of the state. 
WASH. CONS. art. I, § 11 (emphasis added). 
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protection of religious exercise "provided that that person does 
not disturb the public peace, nor obstruct others in their 
religious worship ."25 
From the interpretations given to these provisos, a post- 
Smith jurisprudence has begun to emerge. Such provisos are 
critical to the restoration of the strict scrutiny standard 
because they can be interpreted to  represent the compelling 
interest/least restrictive alternative element of the Sherbert 
balancing test? In fact, they have even been interpreted 
quite literally to mean that the religious conduct at issue must 
be permitted unless the proviso authorizes the state to prevent 
it.27 
Minnesota's Supreme Court was the first state supreme 
court to take a stand against the new standard of judicial 
review, doing so twice within just seven months of Smith. The 
court first refused to  follow Smith in Cooper v. French.28 It 
had a second opportunity when the U.S. Supreme Court 
ordered reconsideration of its 1989 State v. Hershberger 
decision (Hershberger I )  "in light of" Smith.2g On remand, the 
Minnesota Supreme Court held in State v. Hershberger 
(Hershberger II)  that it would not interpret the Federal 
Constitution, given the "uncertainty" in the Free Exercise 
Clause jurisprudence in the wake of Smith.3o In its stead, the 
The Maine Constitution provides: 
All individuals have a natural and unalienable right to worship Almighty 
God according to the dictates of their own consciences, and no person 
shall be hurt, molested or restrained in that person's liberty or estate for 
worshipping God in the manner and season most agreeable to the dictates 
of that person's own conscience, nor for that person's religious professions 
or sentiments, provided that that person does m t  disturb the public peace, 
nor obstruct others in their religious worship. 
CONST. art. 1, 5 3 (emphasis added). The Massachusetts Constitution reads: 
[Nlo subject shall be hurt, molested, or restrained, in his person, liberty, 
or estate, for worshipping GOD in the manner and season most agreeable 
to the dictates of his own conscience; or for his religious profession or 
sentiments; provided he doth not disturb the public peace, or obstruct 
others in their religious worship. 
MASS. CONST. pt. I, art. II (emphasis added). , 
26. See infra note 37 and accompanying text. 
27. See infra note 38 and accompanying text. 
28. 460 N.W.2d 2 (Minn. 1990). 
29. State v. Hershberger, 444 N.W.2d 282 (Minn. 1989), vacated, 495 U.S. 901 
(1990). 
30. State v. Hershberger, 462 N.W.2d 393 (Minn. 1990). This is particularly 
ironic given the way in which the U.S. Supreme Court forced the Minnesota 
Supreme Court in 1963 to use strict scrutiny in In re Jenison Contempt 
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court chose to employ the religious liberty provision of the 
Minnesota Constitution. 
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court was next to 
stand against Smith, holding at the end of 1990 in Society of 
Jesus v. Boston Landmarks Commission that its own 
constitution provided free exercise protection. However, it chose 
an approach different from Minnesota's. Rather than make 
explicit its discomfort with Smith, the court simply analyzed its 
own constitution and, without mentioning Smith or any other 
federal case, never reached the federal issue.31 
The high courts of Maine and Washington have analyzed 
both state and federal constitutions in the post-Smith era, and 
each has explicitly employed an independent standard of 
review for its state constitution. Maine's Supreme Court, in 
Rupert v. City of Portland,s2 required the state to  demonstrate 
a compelling governmental interest under its own constitution. 
The Washington Supreme Court decided First Covenant Church 
v. City of Seattle (First Covenant Church I) on a dual 
interpretation of state and federal free exercise provisions only 
weeks before Smith.33 The U.S. Supreme Court shortly 
thereafter ordered reconsideration of First Covenant Church I 
in light of Smith. On remand, the Washington Supreme Court, 
in First Covenant Church v. City of Seattle (First Covenant 
Church II), employed strict scrutiny under its own 
con~titution.~~ It found that Smith had created uncertainty; 
that it had departed from a long history of established law by 
adopting a test that placed free exercise in a subordinate, 
instead of preferred, position; that it had improperly relied on 
an overruled decision; and that it had accepted a disadvantaged 
status for minority religions, directly contrary to  state positions 
on the issue.35 Since Washington 'State had long before 
rejected the idea that the political majority may control 
Proceedings, 125 N.W.2d 588 (Minn. 1963) through ordering reconsideration in light 
of Sherbert. See infia notes 105-108 and accompanying text. 
31. Society of Jesus v. Boston Landmarks Comm'n, 564 N.E.2d 571 (1990). 
32. 605 A.2d 63 (Me. 1992). The court applied its 1988 holding in Blount v. 
Department of Education & Cultural Services, 551 A.2d 1377 (Me. 1988). 
33. 787 P.2d 1352 (Wash.), vacated, 111 S. Ct. 1097 (1990). 
34. 840 P.2d 174 (Wash. 1992). The Washington Supreme Court employed a 
compelling governmental interest test under its state constitution and under the 
Federal Constitution. It justified the use of strict scrutiny in the latter analysis by 
finding that the categories in Smith that continued to enjoy strict scrutiny were 
applicable here. See supra note 13. 
35. Id. at 185-87. 
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minority rights, it rejected the reasoning and outcome of Smith. 
The texts of the four state constitutions just discussed 
recognize free exercise rights unless such exercise threatens the 
public peace or safety, disturbs other worshippers, or causes 
licentious behavior.36 The supreme courts in these states have 
interpreted these provisos in ways that drastically limit the 
methods by which their respective governments can regulate or 
influence religion. The provisos have been understood to 
require a religious exemption in the absence of a compelling 
state intere~t .~ '  Since Smith, Minnesota, Washington and 
Maine have interpreted their state texts to represent the 
federal Sherbert analysis. 
By contrast, Massachusetts, and the concurring opinion in 
Washington's First Covenant Church II decision, have engaged 
in a very different analysis of their provisos. They have chosen 
not to adopt Sherbert's federal language of compelling state 
interest, but instead apply a rather literal, homegrown 
approach. They ask if the interest the state is trying to promote 
falls within a category listed on the face of the proviso. If it 
does not, the government regulation must yield. Therefore, 
under this interpretation, their constitutions categorically 
prohibit state restraints on religion when provisos are 
inapplicable-no balancing is necessary. However, in  
Massachusetts, even if the proviso is applicable, the state 
interest does not automatically prevail. At that  point, the court 
enters into the balancing test. Such close readings of 
constitutional texts, combined with strict scrutiny balancing, 
have the potential to severely limit the scope of state interests 
that can overbalance religious freedom, and to protect religious 
exercise via exemptions from laws that do not promote those 
narrow categories of state ir~terest.~' 
The California Supreme Court cumently has pending 
before it a case in which it can choose either to follow federal 
36. RONALD K.L. COUINS, THE AMERICAN BENCH, 1985186, at 2496-99 (1986); 
Nicholas P. Miller & Nathan Sheers, Religious Free Exercise Under State 
Constitutions, 34 J. CHURCH & ST. 303, 320-23 (1992). 
37. This interpretation is consistent with the analysis suggested by Professor 
Michael W. McComell in The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free 
Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1455-66 (1990). 
38. Because Society of Jesus v. Boston Landmarks Commission, 564 N.E.2d 571 
(1990), and Justice Utter's concurrence in First Covenant Church v. City of Seattle, 
840 P.2d 174 (Wash. 1992), are text-bound, they might have a limited influence on 
dialogue nationwide. 
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precedent and apply Smith, or to depart from Smith and follow 
its own constitutional provisions on religious liberty. The 
experiences of Minnesota and Washington are particularly 
important because the California constitution shares identical 
proviso language.3g 
The return to a Sherbert analysis, or its equivalent, is 
further justified by another unique aspect of the state 
constitutional texts: the common use of explicitly religious 
language. Many of the free exercise provisions are themselves 
acknowledgments of the right to worship God according to  the 
dictates of one's conscience. In the preambles to forty-five state 
constitutions, the sovereign people invoke a higher authority, 
usually God:' thereby acknowledging an authority prior to 
the state, prior to the law, and prior to thernselves.*l They 
recognize that religious liberty is a prepolitical, fundamental 
human right. When the constitution acknowledges that 
religious duties may take precedence over other duties, and 
that rights to religious exercise are not derived from the state 
but exist prior to it, religious exemptions in the absence of 
overriding state interests make sense.42 Thus; such express 
recognition of a transcendent authority prior to the state is, in 
itself, a significant justification for religious exemptions. 
111. THE NEW JUDICIAL FEDERALISM AND FREE EXERCISE 
Reliance on state constitutions in the free exercise area is 
39. CAL. CONST. art. I, 5 4 reads as follows: "Free exercise and enjoyment of 
religion without discrimination or preference are guaranteed. This liberty of 
conscience does not excuse acts that are licentious or inconsistent with the peace 
or safety of the State." 
40. Mechthild Fritz, Religion in a Federal System: Diversity Versus Uniformity, 
38 KAN. L. REV. 39, 42-43 (1989). The preamble to the New Jersey Constitution of 
1947, representative of many preambles, begins: 
We, the people of the State of New Jersey, gratefbl to  Almighty God for 
the civil and religious liberty which He hath so long permitted us to 
enjoy, and looking to Him for a blessing upon our endeavors to secure 
and transmit the same unimpaired to succeeding generations, do ordain 
and establish this Constitution. 
N.J. CONST. pmbl. 
41. A constitution is the direct act of the sovereign people, and state 
constitutions limit the otherwise plenary power of the state government to  do 
anything not forbidden by federal law. James A. Gardner, The Faikd Discourse of 
State Constitutionalism, 90 MICH. L. REV. 761, 814-16 (1992). 
42. Steven D. Smith, The Rise and Fall of Religious Freedom in Constitutional 
Discourse, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 149, 156-66 (1991); see also McCo~el l ,  supra note 
37, at  1513-17. 
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part of a larger jurisprudential movement scholars call the 
"new judicial federali~m.'"~ During the last twenty years, 
there has been a resurgence of interest in state constitutional 
interpretation as a tool for providing greater protection for 
rights than is available under the Federal Constitution. State 
supreme courts have actively provided greater civil liberties 
than the U.S. Supreme Court in areas of criminal law and free 
speech ever since the Warren Court heyday of individual rights 
ended.44 
Under principles of federalism, state courts have 
tremendous interpretive autonomy regarding individual and 
group rights.45 Each state has its own constitution, and the 
state supreme court is the final arbiter of its meaning. The 
substance of the interpretation can track the federal courts' 
interpretation of the comparable federal provision or it can 
differ significantly.46 But even though it can differ, the 
interpretation of state law cannot conflict with federal law:' 
Acknowledging additional rights under state constitutions does 
not cause conflicts; only an attempt to reduce rights recognized 
in the federal constitution will do so. If no conflict exists, the 
state's ruling on its own constitution is authoritative and final, 
and cannot be overturned by the U.S. Supreme Court. In the 
case of a conflict, the state supreme court's ruling is subject to  
U.S. Supreme Court review where the federal interpretation 
will govern the outcome of the litigati~n.~' 
43. See TARR & PORTER, supra note 5, a t  2 n.4. 
44. See William J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights and the States: The Revival 
of State Constitutions as Guardians of Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 535 
(1986) [hereinafter Breman, Guardians of Individual Rights]; B r e ~ a n ,  supra note 
5. The success of the new judicial federalism is the topic of some debate, with 
some commentators seeing the glass half full and others seeing i t  half empty. 
Compare Gardner, supra note 41, with Ronald K.L. Collins & Peter J. Galie, 
Models of Post-Incorporation Judicial Review: 1985 Survey of State Constitutional 
Individual Rights Decisions, 55 U. CIN. L. REV. 317 (1986). 
45. JENNIFER F EISEN, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: LITIGATING INDMDUAL 
RIGHTS, CLAIMS AND DEFENSES (1992); Brennan, Guardians of Individual Rights, 
supra note 44, at  501; B r e ~ a n ,  supm note 5, a t  500-02. 
46. TARR & PORTER, supra note 5, a t  7-8. 
47. Id. "Conflict" refers only to those situations in which the state 
interpretation yields less protection from government encroachment than does the 
federal understanding. 
48. Id.; Robert F. Williams, State Constitutional Law Processes, 24 W M .  & 
MARY L. REV. 169, 182 (1983). This result is mandated by the Supremacy Clause, 
which reads: "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be 
made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under 
the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and 
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All this assumes that the state court makes clear that it is 
interpreting its own constitution. In Society of Jesus v. Boston 
Landmarks Commission, the Supreme Judicial Court of 
Massachusetts interpreted its own fundamental law and never 
reached the federal constitutional claim. The court made it 
absolutely clear that it was rendering a final opinion on its own 
state constitutional law. But in analyses that discuss both 
federal and state constitutions, confusion often exists over 
whether the decision is based on state or federal grounds. The 
U.S. Supreme Court has no jurisdiction to review a decision on 
state grounds that is not otherwise in conflict with federal law; 
but it does have jurisdiction to review any state court decision 
based on federal law because state courts must interpret that 
law in accordance with federal precedentPg 
Since its landmark decision in Michigan v. Long,50 the 
U.S. Supreme Court has presumed that state court decisions 
involving common constitutional protections are interpretations 
of the federal provision (and thereby within its jurisdiction) 
unless the state court has made an explicit statement that the 
decision is based upon "independent and adequate state 
grounds."51 The general rule is that if a state court concludes 
that both federal and state constitutions are violated, the final 
state court decision is not re~iewable.~~ But the state court 
exposes itself to review if, when it finds a violation of both 
constitutions, it is unclear as to how the state ground stands 
independent of the federal one (particularly if it relies wholly 
the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or 
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." U.S. CONST. art. VI. 
49. TARR & PORTER, supra note 5, at 8-9. 
50. 463 US. 1032 (1983). 
51. Id. at  1037. The state court is required to provide a plain statement that 
its decision is grounded in the adequate and independent interpretation of its own 
constitution. "Otherwise, the Court will assume it has the jurisdiction to review 
when the state decision is primarily determined by federal law, when it is 
interwoven with federal law, when national precedents are cited other than for 
purposes of guidance, or when such precedents are said to compel the result 
reached." Stanley H. Friedelbaum, Jdicial Federalism: The Interplay of National - 
State Standards, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE STATES: NEW DIRECTION IN 
CONSTITUTIONAL POLICY MAKING 18 (Stanley H. Friedelbaum ed., 1988). Other 
ways of asserting interpretive independence include distinguishing facts and taking 
advantage of ambiguities in federal precedent. TARR & PORTER, supm note 5, a t  
14-15. 
52. Murdock v. Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1874) (Supreme Court will 
not review issues of state law). See Sandra D. O'Comor, Our Jdicial Federalism, 
35 CASE W .  RES. L. REV. 1, 5-6 (1984). 
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on federal precedent in reaching its c o n c l ~ s i o n ) . ~ ~  
Furthermore, if the state court strikes down a state law or 
regulation because it violates a federal provision comparable to 
a particular state provision, then the decision is reviewable for 
lacking an independent state ground.54 The analysis is 
simpler when the state court denies relief and holds that 
neither state nor federal law is violated. That judgment is 
reviewable because it can never be independent of the federal 
ground. Thus, Michigan u. Long acknowledges interpretive 
autonomy for state courts in their grants of relief (based on 
independent and adequate grounds) but never for their denial 
of relief.55 
The independent and adequate state grounds emerge from 
the language, traditions and different institutional positions of 
the federal and state supreme courts.56 Differences in text are 
perhaps the most fertile source of interpretative autonomy. 
State constitutions differ substantially from the federal text 
and from each other; many are remarkably detailed and 
specih5' In over forty of the state documents, invocations of 
a Supreme Being are followed by numerous terms describing 
religious liberty and protecting the rights of conscience, 
worship, and religious opinion and exercise from interference, 
infringement, control, discrimination, preference, persecution or 
compulsion.58 Twenty constitutions contain provisos like those 
53. See Long, 463 U.S. at 1040-41. 
When . . . a state court decision fairly appears to rest primarily on 
federal law, or to be interwoven with the federal law, and when the 
adequacy and independence of any possible state law ground is not clear 
from the face of the opinion, we will accept as the most reasonable 
explanation that the state court decided the case the way it did because 
it believed that federal law required it do so. 
Id. 
54. O'Connor, supra note 52, at  6. 
55. Id. 
56. TARR &PORTER, supra note 5, at  208. 
57. For information regarding the sources of language of state constitutions, see 
Leonard W. Levy, The Original Meaning of the Establishment Clause of the First 
Amendment, in RELIGION AND THE STATE 50-52 (James E. Wood, Jr. ed., 1985); 
McConnell, supra note 37, at 1426-27; 3 ANSON P. STOKES, CHURCH AND STATE IN 
THE UNITED STATES 443-44 (1950); State v. DeLaBruere, 577 A.2d 254, 270 (Vt. 
1990). 
Because of the textual specificity, interpretations in many cases may be easy, 
unlike the sparse federal text which often must be filled with content. Tarr, supra 
note 6, at 94-95. But compare Gardner's criticism that this reduces the lofty aims 
of state constitutions because they behave more like statutes. Gardner, supra note 
41, at 800, 819-21. 
58. Miller & Sheers, supra note 36, at  312; FREISEN, supra note 45, 8 4.06. 
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already mentioned:' many also recite religious exemptions 
from taxation and military service.60 In addition, the state 
texts often recognize rights that have no federal co~nterpart.~' 
The history of these specific provisions may inform a state 
court of a specific intent of the framers that is particularly 
meaningful to the case before it.62 
The traditions of the state and its courts may also be 
significant to interpretive independence. Pre-existing state 
law-common, statutory and constitutional-may take a court 
in directions that differ from federal trends. This happened in 
First Covenant Church 11, where the Washington Supreme 
Court criticized Smith for placing free exercise in a 
subordinate, instead of preferred, position and for accepting a 
disadvantaged status for minority religions, directly contrary to 
state positions on the issue.63 States may justify a particular 
interpretation that differs from the federal understanding by 
reference to historical experiences of the state, specific 
socioeconomic or demographic concerns (such as particular 
ethnic, racial or religious minorities), matters of particular local 
interest, o r  the public attitudes of the state's  citizen^.'^ 
Freisen documents the variety of religious liberty provisions found in state 
constitutions. Those provisions, followed by the number of state constitutions 
containing such provisions, are as follows: Generally securing toleration of religious 
sentiment-10; no molestation in persodproperty for religious opinion-11; right to 
worship-27; freedom of conscience-38; forbidding discrimination against free 
exercise or based on religion--34; free exercise clause like federal-9; no compelled 
church attendanc+29; right to refrain from religious services in public schools-5; 
exemption from military-23; religious exemption from state taxation-34; no 
religious test for jury, witness, franchise, etc.-19; establishment clause like 
federal-11; no preference clause-32; ban on religiouslsectarian control of publicly 
funded schools or religious indoctrination in public schools-19; release time-6; no 
compulsory individual money contributions--30; no giftslfundslappropriations to  
religious institutions-34; exemption for transportation/textbooks/grants-8; no 
religious control of public education funding-3. Id. app. 4A at 1-17. 
59. Tarr, supra note 6, at 77. 
60. CHE~TER J. ANTIEAU El' AL., RELIGION UNDER THE STATE CONSTITUTIONS ch. 
6 (1965). 
61. See, e.g., Kentucky State Bd. of Educ. v. Rudasill, 589 S.W.2d 877 (Ky. 
1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 938 (1980), discussed infia note 134 and accompanying 
text. 
62. See Tarr, supra note 6, at 94, 95. 
63. First Covenant Church v. City of Seattle, 840 P.2d 174, 187 (Wash. 1992). 
64. See State v. Williams, 459 A.2d 641, 650-51 (N.J. 1983); State v. Hunt, 450 
A.2d 952 (N.J. 1982); State v. Gunwall, 720 P.2d 808 (Wash. 1986). See generally 
Terence J. Fleming & Jack Nordby, The Minnesota Bill of Rights: %apt in the 
Old Miasmal Mist", 7 HAMLINE L. REV. 51 (1984); James W. Talbot, Rethinking 
Civil Liberties Under the Washington State Constitution, 66 WASH. L. REV. 1099 
(1991). 
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Particular sensitivities (as well as particular prejudices) are 
reflected in these interpretive traditions because, as one judge 
writes, "states demystify constitutional law . . . . [State courtsl 
say precisely what they mean." State constitutions are more 
frequently amended than the Federal Constitution, and the 
"democratic process is more likely to be reflected" in them.65 
Different institutional positions further justify separate 
state constitutional interpretations. The Federal Constitution 
must be interpreted on behalf of the nation. Thus, the 
institutional position of state courts differs from that of federal 
courts because concerns about a national polity are lacking: the 
state constitutional decision is not made for the country as a 
whole. By contrast, since the Supreme Court does rule for the 
nation, it at times decides an issue in a particular way 
precisely because it wants to  respect or preclude state diversity 
on that issue-a role not relevant to state 
Many other reasons are commonly proffered for giving 
attention to state constitutions. One of the main reasons is the 
lack of stability, consistency or coherence in much federal 
j u r i s p r ~ d e n c e . ~ ~  The high courts of Minnesota and 
Washington, when independently interpreting their state 
provisions, both cited the "uncertainty" caused by Smith 
because of its departure from a long history of established 
law?' The state courts that have departed from Smith are 
obviously opposed t o  the definition of religious liberty now 
employed by the Supreme Court, and are unpersuaded by the 
high court's reasoning.6g Another reason for giving attention 
to state constitutions is that often there is inadequate guidance 
at the federal level, perhaps because the Supreme Court has 
never addressed issues which arise more commonly at the state 
level. 
The propriety of departing from federal precedent has been 
a matter of great debate. Proponents of a "relational" 
65. Yvonne Kauger, Reflections on Federalism: Protections Afforded by State 
Constitutions, 27 GONZ. L. REV. 1, 12-13 (1991). 
66. B r e ~ a n ,  Guardians of Individual Rights, supra note 44, a t  546; Peter J. 
Galie, The Other Supreme Courts: Judicial Activism Among State Supreme Courts, 
33 SYRACUSE L. REV. 731, 733, 744, 764, 791 (1982). Additionally, procedural and 
jurisdictional differences may give broader jurisdiction to state courts. 
67. Kauger, supm note 65, at  7. 
68. State v. Hershberger, 462 N.W.2d 393, 396-97 (Mim. 1990); First Covenant 
Church v. City of Seattle, 840 P.2d 174, 187 (Wash. 1992). 
69. B r e ~ a n ,  supra note 5, a t  500; Fritz, supm note 40, at 61; Tam, supra note 
6, at 106. 
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understanding of the state and federal constitutions view state 
constitutions only in relation to the federal text and 
interpretation. They argue that states, as part of a federal 
polity, should give great deference to  decisions of the U.S. 
Supreme Court and depart from federal precedent only for 
"cogent and persuasive  reason^,"^' only where state and 
federal texts differ, or only where a previously established body 
of state law leads to a different result.71 For this "federal-first" 
school of interpretation, the presumption favors a uniform 
interpretation of state and federal texts unless a departure is 
sufficiently justified. Thus, the state text is understood and 
invoked only in relation to  the federal text and merely 
supplements the federal ''floor'' of rights. 72 
A non-relational understanding of state constitutional 
interpretation starts from the opposite position that "there is 
no basis in constitutional law for presuming that the state 
constitution parallels the federal constitution. The state 
constitution must be interpreted separately from the federal 
constitution unless there are good reasons of policy to establish 
a uniform interpretati~n."~~ The major proponent of this state 
primacy or "state-first" approach was Justice Hans Linde, 
70. Sands v. Morongo Unified Sch. Dist., 809 P.2d 809, 847 (Cal. 1991) (Lucas, 
C.J., concurring), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 3026 (1992). 
71. Justice Pollack of the New Jersey Supreme Court argues that 
in appropriate cases, the individual states may accord greater respect 
than the federal government to  certain fundamental rights . . . . 
. . . .  
Nonetheless, we proceed cautiously before declaring rights under our 
state Constitution that differ significantly from those enumerated by the 
United States Supreme Court in its interpretation of the federal 
Constitution. Our caution emanates, in part, from our recognition of the 
general advisability in a federal system of uniform interpretation of 
identical constitutional provisions. 
Right to Choose v. Byrne, 450 A.2d 925, 931-32 (NJ. 1982) (citations omitted). 
72. See B r e ~ a n ,  Guardians of Individual Rights, supra note 44, at 548; 
Brennan, supra note 5, at 491, 502-04; Kauger, supra note 65, at 2. These 
relational views can be further broken down into the following: Equivalence Model 
(presumption that state constitutional rights are equivalent to  federal counterparts); 
Equivalence Plus Model (the state constitution can recognize greater rights than 
under federal counterparts); Equivalence Minus Model (federal standards do not 
control what is found under state constitution). The Equivalence Plus Model is the 
most popular in the "new judicial federalism." Collins & Galie, supra note 44, a t  
323-34. 
73. Right to Choose, 450 A.2d at  948 (Pashman, J., concurring in part, 
dissenting in part); see also Morongo, 809 P.2d at  836 (Mosk, J., concurring); 
Stanley H. Mosk, State Constitutionalism: Both Liberal and Conservative, 63 TEX. 
L. REV. 1081 (1985). 
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former Oregon Supreme Court Justice, who argued that the 
state constitution should be interpreted without any reference 
to the federal law; in fact, in his view, it should be analyzed 
first.74 If the issue can be disposed of on state constitutional 
grounds, then the court need not reach the federal issue under 
the comparable federal provision. If, however, the outcome 
would differ under the federal analysis, the court would then 
engage in a federal interpretation. Because of Justice Linde's 
presence on the state's high court, Oregon uses this non- 
relational approach.75 Indeed, it employed just such an 
approach in the court's 1986 decision in Smith u. Employment 
Div i~ ion ,~~  the same case that eventually made its way to  the 
U.S. Supreme Court and revolutionized federal free exercise 
doctrine. The Oregon court held that, under the state's 
constitution, Smith could be denied unemployment 
compensation because a generally applicable, facially neutral 
law like the unemployment benefits statute could not violate 
the religious exercise provisions of the state constitution even if 
an inadvertent burden on religious exercise resulted. Under the 
Federal Constitution, however, the Oregon Supreme Court 
applied the Sherbert analysis, which, the court concluded, 
compelled a different result. 
From the Oregon experience it is clear that a commitment 
to  develop an independent body of state constitutional law will 
not necessarily expand upon the rights given by corresponding 
federal pro~isions.~~ Nevertheless, it appears to be the 
74. See Hans A. Linde, E Pluribus, 18 GA. L. REV. 165 (1984); Hans A. Linde, 
First Things First: Rediscovering the States' Bill of Rights, 9 U. BALT. L. REV. 379 
(1980). Non-relational, independent forms of state constitutional analysis can be 
broken down as follows: the Nonequivalent Text Model (the state constitution is 
interpreted differently because the text, history, and purpose of the provision 
differs from the federal counterpart), and the Nonequivalent Model (the "state first" 
analysis that is concerned with the "analytical soundness" of the state 
constitutional interpretation). Collins & Galie, supra note 44, at 328-36. 
75. Collins & Galie, supra note 44, at 333-36; TARR & PORTER, supra note 5, a t  
30. The "state first" or primacy theory of state constitutional interpretation has 
also been employed in Washington, Maine, New Hampshire and Vermont. Collins 
& Galie, supra note 44, at 333. 
76. Smith v. Employment Div., 721 P.2d 445 (Or. 1986), vacated, 485 U.S. 660 
(1988); Black v. Employment Div., 721 P.2d 451 (Or. 1986), vacated sub nom. 
Employment Div. v. Smith, 485 U.S. 660 (1988). 
77. Neither the federal-first nor the state-fnst approach necessarily yields 
expanded constitutional rights. A relational theory like Justice B r e ~ a n ' s  justifies 
resort to state constitutions only for the purpose of more expansive interpretations, 
but the circumstances that justify such use may be quite limited. See supra note 
70-72 and accompanying text. Similarly, under a state-first approach, rights might 
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considered judgment of most commentators on the new judicial 
federalism that the state-first approach holds the best hope for 
integrity of interpretation "in the light of text and tradition," 
wholly independent of the federal analysis.7s Independent 
state interpretation has the tremendous benefit of "analytical 
so~ndness."~~ The state's high court can build a separate body 
of consistent constitutional law, thereby avoiding the frequent 
fluctuations of federal law." "[Tlhe logic of principled 
be curtailed instead of expanded, as is evidenced by the Oregon Supreme Court's 
earliest Smith decision. Tarr has noted that Oregon has "made important efforts to 
resuscitate free exercise provisions of its Constitution." But that "resuscitation" 
refers to the state's independence in interpreting its own fundamental law; it 
certainly does not refer to expansion of rights. Tarr, supra note 6, at 77. Thus, the 
relational approach might be more sensitive to problems with the federal doctrine, 
and might produce state decisional law expanding upon federal rights, but it might 
do so in only a very narrow category of cases. The state primacy approach might 
be more conducive to developing a coherent religion doctrine that treats free 
exercise and establishment provisions comprehensively, but would not necessarily 
enhance the protection of religious liberty. See infra notes 207-218 and 
accompanying text. 
78. Glendon & Yanes, supra note 7, at 549. See generally Collins & Galie, 
supra note 44; TARR & PORTER, supra note 5; Emily F. Hartigan, Law and 
Mystery: Calling the Letter to Life Through the Spirit of the Law of State 
Constitutions, 6 J.L. & REL. 225 (1988). But see Gardner, supra note 41, at 812-30. 
79. Collins & Galie, supra note 44, at 333. Perhaps the coherence and 
"analytical soundness* of the state-first model responds adequately to the concerns 
of the late Professor Paul Bator, who said, Y must confess to some misgivings 
about the extent to which some of this commentary [on the new judicial 
federalism] seems to assume that state constitutional law is simply 'available' to be 
manipulated to negate Supreme Court decisions which are deemed unsatisfactory." 
Williams, supra note 48, at 189. 
80. Commentators continue to argue in favor of the state-first model in the 
area of religious exercise and church-state relations. See FREISEN, supra note 45; 
Fritz, supra note 40; Tam, supra note 6. Professor J e ~ i f e r  Freisen, in her recent 
treatise on state constitutional law, laments the dilemmas handed to states when 
they base their interpretation of their own constitutions on federal decisional law. 
While she concentrates on the establishment provisions, and in particular the state 
application of the federal test in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), her 
comments apply to the free exercise area as well. State courts slide all over the 
doctrinal landscape because they attempt to track Supreme Court decisions. 
According to Freisen, 
When a state court simply incorporates the prevailing federal standard 
into a state interpretation, notwithstanding the difference in text, the 
clarity and stability of the results is in some doubt. Given the extreme 
flexibility of many federal standards, it is not surprising that state courts 
that opt for this approach often render opinions inconsistent with later 
rulings of the Supreme Court and even inconsistent with the state's own 
earlier opinions. 
FREISEN, supra note 45, $ 4.04. State application of the federal establishment test 
has been particularly problematic, and now appears to  be problematic with the 
shift from Sherbert to Smith at  the federal level. See infra notes 153-156 and 
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interpretation at the state level . . . demands that any given 
argument be tested on its own merits independently of what 
level of constitutional protection could result."81 If the result 
conflicts with federal law, then the litigants could not win 
under the state constitution." Even if the state interpretation 
is not controlling because the Supremacy Clause requires 
application of federal precedent, the state's analysis may apply 
in future cases if federal jurisprudence changes or if the facts of 
the next case render federal precedent inappli~able.~~ 
Under both the federal-first and state-first approaches, 
state courts can establish "independent and adequate grounds" 
for violations of state constitutional guarantees, which would 
preclude U.S. Supreme Court review under Michigan u. Long. 
Under the federal-first analysis, the independent and adequate 
grounds requirement would be met when, for instance, the 
state court finds sufficient justification in its state 
constitutional text and case history for departing from the 
federal a n a l y ~ i s . ~  Under the state-first analysis, the 
requirement would be met when the state constitution is 
analyzed without resort t o  federal law.85 
Recent reliance on state constitutions may signal that state 
courts are moving to  reclaim an interpretive role in free 
exercise cases. With varying degrees, colonial charters and 
later state constitutions acknowledged the religious rights of 
citizens in the pre- and post-revolutionary eras.86 When 
accompanying text. Once states commit themselves to following federal decisional 
law, the temptation to follow the federal courts in lockstep (including its 
unpredictable fluctuations) is overwhelming. Fritz, supra note 40, at 69, 72. 
81. Tam, supra note 6, at  79 11.28 (quoting Ronald Collins, Reliance on State 
Constitutions-Away from a Reactionary Approach, 9 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1, 15 
(198 1)). 
82. Id. at 79-80. 
83. Id. at 78-79. 
84. See First Covenant Church v. City of Seattle, 840 P.2d 174 (Wash. 1992). 
But see Rupert v. City of Portland, 605 A.2d 63 (Me. 1992) (case is subject to 
review on the federal determination because court held that neither constitution 
was violated and a denial of relief is never independent). 
85. State v. Hershberger, 462 N.W.2d 393 (Minn. 1990); Cooper v. French, 460 
N.W.2d 2 (Minn. 1990); Society of Jesus v. Boston Landmarks Comm'n, 564 N.E.2d 
571 (Mass. 1990). 
86. McConnell, supra note 37, at 1425-30, 1455-66. 
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drafted, the First Amendment restricted only federal action. 
The Supreme Court reaffirmed this in 1845, when it explicitly 
stated that the religious liberty of citizens was to be protected 
by the laws and constitutions of the  state^.^' During the next 
century, state courts created a considerable body of state 
constitutional law governing such issues as restrictions on 
religion, Bible reading in public schools, the use of public 
property for religious purposes, and aid to religious schools.88 
States continued their state constitutional analyses even after 
1940, when the U.S. Supreme Court (as part of its broader 
activity of selective incorporation) applied the Free Exercise 
Clause of the First Amendment to the states through the 
Fourteenth A~nendrnent.~~ 
Until the 1960s, state courts were consistently unwilling to 
recognize religious exercise claims made under the state 
 constitution^.^^ Under what Professor Alan Tam calls the 
"secular regulation rule," the vast majority of cases upheld the 
police power of the states to "limit personal liberties in the 
interest of the public Repeated requests for religious 
exemptions from general laws were denied based on the state's 
legitimate role in preventing injury to public health, public 
morality, public safety and the good order of society.g2 
In  the mid-twentieth century many assumed the secular 
87. The Court refused to accept jurisdiction over a Louisiana criminal 
prosecution of a Catholic priest convicted of violating a local ordinance which 
prohibited corpses to be displayed in churches during funeral services. Permoli v. 
Municipality No. 1, 44 U.S. 589 (1845), relying in part on Barron v. Mayor of 
Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833) (first eight amendments of U.S. Constitution 
not applicable to the states). 
88. See ANTIEAU ET AL., supra note 60; FREISEN, supm note 45, $ 4.01; Fritz, 
supra note 40, at  61; Tam, supra note 6, a t  89-101. 
89. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940). 
90. Monrad G. Paulsen, State Constitutions, State Courts and First Amendment 
Freedoms, 4 VAND. L. REV. 620, 627 (1951); see also ANTIEAU ET AL., supra note 
60, a t  ch. 6; Marc Galanter, Religious Freedom in the United States: A Turning 
Point?, 1966 WIS. L. REV. 217; G. Alan Tam, State Constitutionalism and "First 
Amendment' Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE STATES: NEW DIRECTIONS IN 
C O N ~ I O N A L  POLICYMAKING 21, 23-24 (Stanley H. Friedelbaum ed., 1988). 
91. ANTIEAU ET AL., supra note 60, at 65. 
92. Id. at 68-95. Laws challenged involved vaccinations against communicable 
disease, unauthorized practice of medicine, fluoridation of water supply, 
contraception, transfusions and medical care, Sunday closing, polygamy, blasphemy, 
prohibition on alcoholic beverages, use of dangerous instrumentalities in religious 
ceremonies, fortune telling and spiritualism, distribution of religious literature and 
solicitation, and zoning. 
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regulation rule was consistent with religious freedom.93 It is 
easy to understand why. During that period there was 
widespread accommodation of Christianity, the religion of the 
majority. Accordingly, voluntary Bible reading and prayer in  
the public schools were upheld," as were anti-blasphemy laws 
and Sunday closing laws.95 Moreover, legislative religious 
exemptions, while not common, existed.96 For instance, state 
constitutions often provided for property tax exemptions for 
churches and military exemptions for conscientious objectors. 
No state religion was officially established, no taxes supported 
any worship, and no state interfered with conscience in matters 
of religious belief.g7 Perhaps most importantly, the secular 
laws themselves were considered to protect a religio-moral 
order. "The courts always protect the state against immoral 
practices that are clearly at variance with the established 
standards of Christian civilization.'@' If the state courts 
93. See, e.g., STOKES, supra note 57, at 446-47. 
94. See, e.g., Doremus v. Board of Educ., 75 A.2d 880 (N.J. 1950), appeal 
dismissed, 342 U.S. 429 (1952). In Doremus, the New Jersey Supreme Court 
discussed a state statute requiring "at least five verses from the [Old Testament 
to] be read, without comment, in each public school classroom," N.J. STAT. ANN. 
$ 18:14-77, while mandating "[nlo religious service or exercise . . . shall be held in 
any school receiving [public money]," N.J. STAT. ANN. $ 18:14-78, "except the 
reading of the Bible and repeating of the Lord's Prayer." The court held that the 
statutes did not violate the First or Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. 
Constitution regarding the prohibition against the establishment of religion because 
the statutes 
do not go to the establishment of religion or against the free exercise 
thereof . . . . [I]t is clear . . . that the sense of the [First] [Almendment 
does not serve to prohibit government from recognizing the existence and 
sovereignty of God . . . . The fact is that the First Amendment does not 
say, and so far as we are able to determine was not intended to say, 
that God shall not be acknowledged by our government as God . . . . We 
consider that the Old Testament and the Lord's Prayer, pronounced 
without comment, are not sectarian, and that the short exercise provided 
by the statute does not constitute sectarian instruction or sectarian 
worship but is a simple recognition of the Supreme Ruler of the 
Universe . . . . 
Doremus, 75 A.2d at  889. 
95. ANTIEAU ET AL., supra note 60, at 80. 
96. Id. at  69-70 (Christian Science healers exempt from medical licensing 
requirements); id. at  83 (sacramental use of wine exempt from alcohol prohibition 
laws). 
97. STOKES, supm note 57, at  447. 
98. Id. Stokes lists three "tests to which religious freedom may be put: does its 
manifestation interfere with freedom of others; does i t  result in actdpradices 
detrimental to social welfare or safety of the state; does it run counter to the 
moral law?" Id. at 695. 
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thought state laws upheld a religio-moral order, exemptions 
from those laws to permit religious exercise must have seemed 
an outrageous notion.gg Furthermore, the argument that 
limited government could burden free exercise was difficult for 
courts to comprehend because pre-1940 America was 
unfamiliar with the expansive bureaucratic apparatus of 
today's government. 
The earliest signs of erosion of the secular regulation rule 
came in the areas of hand bill distribution and the licensing of 
literature. State courts in the 1920s and -1930s repeatedly 
upheld restrictions on the distribution of religious literature, 
primarily affecting Jehovah's Witnesses. By the late 1930s, the 
U.S. Supreme Court had begun to strike down these laws 
under a more expansive free speech jurisprudence, and then 
later, in 1940, under free exercise doctrine.loO After 
incorporation, and with the realization that the Supreme 
Court's interest in the Jehovah's Witnesses meant a federal 
override of state laws, some state courts began to hold 
restrictions on literature distribution unconstitutional under 
their own constitutions (on the grounds that they infringed 
religious freedom or lacked fair and adequate standards).lO' 
Despite the Supreme Court's attention t o  rights of religious 
expression, prior to  1963 state courts continued to interpret 
their constitutions to require only that limits on religion be 
minimally rational, meet due process requirements, and not 
contain unnecessary, unfair, unreasonable, or discriminatory 
standards.lo2 But then came Sherbert v. Verner.lo3 Sherbert 
99. See, e.g., Dziatkiewicz v. Township of Maplewood, 178 A. 205 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 
1935) (upholding township ordinance prohibiting canvassing and distribution of 
literature without permit as a reasonable exercise of police power). The supreme 
court of New Jersey scolded the Jehovah's Witness claimants for not being 
abiding: 
I t  would seem to this court that men and women engaged in the loRy 
and idealistic work, as the prosecutors claim to have been engaged 
herein, i.e., of spreading their religious conceptions to the public at large, 
ought to be among the very first to submit to and comply with all 
reasonable regulations which, obviously, were enacted in the interest of 
the public health and safety and which regulations were designed for the 
good of the greatest number. 
Id. at  208. 
law 
100. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (free exercise); Schneider v. 
New Jersey, 308 US. 147 (1939) (free speech); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 US. 
444 (1938) (free speech). 
101. ANTIEAU ET AL., supra note 60, a t  88-89. 
102. Id. at 87, 98-99. Writing in 1951, one commentator lamented, 
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revolutionized the federal interpretation of the Free Exercise 
Clause of the First Amendment by requiring a strict scrutiny 
standard of review for general laws that burden religious 
exercise.lo4 Because of incorporation, it also revolutionized 
the way states interpreted parallel constitutional provisions. 
Sherbert's impact on the states' treatment of religious 
exercise under their own constitutions is best illustrated by the 
Minnesota case of In  re Jenison.lo5 Minnesota citizen Laverna 
Jenison refused to serve as a juror because of the biblical 
command that we not judge one another. She was sentenced to 
30 days in jail for contempt of court, having failed to comply 
with her civic duties. The Supreme Court of Minnesota, in 
upholding her conviction and sentence, found that Article 1, 
Section 16 of the Minnesota Constitution and the First 
. Amendment of the U.S. Constitution did not require an 
exemption from a law expressing a generally applicable legal 
obligation.lo6 A legislative exemption for religiously inspired 
conscientious objection would have been upheld, but a judicial 
exemption would not be mandated. Three months later, the 
U.S. Supreme Court decided Sherbert. On a writ of certiorari, 
the Supreme Court subsequently remanded Jenison to 
Minnesota's high court, with instructions to reconsider in light 
Although state constitutions contain full statements of our civil liberties, 
on the whole the record of state court guardianship of "First Amendment 
Freedoms" is disappointing. Only occasionally do state cases . . . take a 
position protecting the freedoms beyond what has been required by the 
United States Supreme Court . . . . Time and time again, the United 
States Supreme Court has found it necessary to reverse many state 
courts which were  oversolicitous of local attempts to silence unpopular 
ideas on the ground of traffic control, the administration of public parks 
or the possibility of violence. 
Paulsen, supra note 90, at 642. This lack of initiative was not surprising; except 
for the freedom of expression cases, even federal precedent was itself steeped in 
the minimum rationality tradition. See, e.g., State v. Perricone, 181 A.2d 751 (N.J.) 
(blood transfusion ordered for child of Jehovah's Witness parents does not violate 
state or federal constitution), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 890 (1962). Neither Reynolds v. 
United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879) (holding prohibition of polygamous practices of 
Mormons constitutional) nor Prince v. Massachusetts, 32 1 U.S. 158 (1944) (holding 
prohibition on literature distribution by Jehovah's Witness child under child labor 
laws constitutional), both discussed in ~erricone, suggests a strid scrutiny standard 
of review for government restrictions on religious conduct. Thus, states did not 
- 
have much internal or external impetus to depart from the secular regulation rule. 
103. 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
104. See id. at 406-10. 
105. In re Jenison, 120 N.W.2d 515 (Mind,  vacated, 375 U.S. 14 (1963). 
106. Note that aRer incorporation, states made determinations under both 
constitutions if the federal claim was pleaded. 
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of Sherbert.''? The Minnesota Supreme Court, pursuant to 
the Supremacy Clause, applied the new strict scrutiny 
standard of review and mandated an exemption from jury duty. 
The court found that "there has been an inadequate showing 
that the state's interest in obtaining competent jurors requires 
us to override [Laverna Jenison'sl right t o  the free exercise of 
her religi~n."''~ 
A subtle shift of emphasis in the state courts from state to 
federal constitutional law is observable after Sherbert. To use 
Minnesota as an example, in the pre-Sherbert decisions, the 
Minnesota Supreme Court based its decisions on both the state 
and federal constitutions. After Sherbert, however, there was 
no longer any mention of the state constitution; it had, in 
effect, vanished fkom the opinions' texts and presumably from 
the court's consideration. If incorporation made it necessary t o  
look a t  both the state and federal constitutional law, Sherbert 
seemed to require reference only to the federal text. The sheer 
power of the federal requirement of a drastically higher 
standard of judicial review-requiring not mere rationality but 
strict scrutiny-pushed state constitutional texts to the 
margins. log 
Hence, during the Sherbert years (1963-1990), state courts 
followed federal doctrine and precedent to the virtual exclusion 
of their own fundamental law. This is certainly 
understandable. Sherbert required strict scrutiny of laws 
burdening religion. Consequently, states were required to 
abandon their well-developed secular regulation rule. Even if a 
state had attempted independently to ensure generous 
protection of religious exercise under its own constitution, the 
controlling federal precedent would make such an attempt 
largely redundant."' Therefore, a separate s ta te  
constitutional jurisprudence in free exercise was 
107. In re Jenison, 375 U.S. 14 (1963). 
108. In re Jenison, 125 N.W.2d 588 (1963). Note that the instruction to remand 
for reconsideration was really a requirement to apply the compelling interest 
standard. Minnesota was not free to apply a lower standard of judicial review 
because its own constitution had been interpreted in that way; federalism permits 
state constitutions to provide greater protection, but not less. 
109. "Incorporation has had an enormous impact on the constitutional law 
applied by state courts. AfZer incorporation, there are no entirely independent 
models of state judicial review." Federal decisions became paramount, and federal 
decisional law continues to influence much of the thinking of those working with 
parallel state constitutional guarantees. Collins & Galie, supra note 44, at 322. 
110. See infia notes 118-143 and accompanying text. 
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unnecessary. 11' 
As a result, during the Sherbert years most states "rel[ied] 
on federal law on free exercise issues, even in areas where [the] 
Supreme Court [had] not ruled."l12 The vast majority did not 
engage in any separate state analysis because they either 
completely ignored their state  constitution^,^^^ or considered 
state provisions coextensive with the federal counterpart.ll4 
In this second group of cases it is difficult to determine 
whether there was any independent state basis for the 
 judgment^."^ Although this lack of independent state 
jurisprudence is understandable, it was still problematic. One 
effect of reliance on federal doctrine for all or most of the cases 
involving religion was to prevent any serious development of a 
comprehensive state constitutional law of religious liberty 
grounded in the state's text and tradition. Additionally, by 
choosing to use state provisions in a piecemeal fashion, if at all, 
state courts did not have to grapple with significant issues 
touching on the relationship between the establishment and 
free exercise concepts in their own state law? And finally, 
federal courts and  interpretations contributed dis- 
proportionately to the development of state law."? 
Despite the fact that controlling federal precedent rendered 
independent state analysis largely extraneous, a small group of 
states did explicitly interpret their religious liberty provisions 
prior to 1990.118 Maine,"' Mi~s iss ippi , '~~  Tennessee,l2l 
111. Only in the Establishment Clause area has there been noticeable reliance 
on state constitutions, but even there federal doctrine and precedent remains 
predominant. See Note, Beyond the Establishment Clause: Enforcing Separation of 
Church and State Through State Constitutional Provisions, 71 VA. L. REV. 625 
(1985). 
112. TARR & PORTER, supra note 5, at  21; see also State v. DeLaBruere, 577 
A.2d 254 (Vt. 1990); Miller & Sheers, supra note 36. This has occurred largely 
because of the assumption that state constitutional guarantees "were mere 
analogues of the federal guarantees and therefore afforded no independent 
protection." TARR & PORTER, supra note 5, at  21. 
State court discussions of constitutional rights usually referred to those of 
federal constitutional law. See Gardner, supra note 41. 
113. Miller & Sheers, supra note 36, at  307. 
114. Id. at  310-11. Gardner calls this the "lockstep analysis." Gardner, supra 
note 41, at  788. 
115. This common problem of obscurity-states failing to specify upon which 
constitution a holding is grounded-is discussed at length in Gardner, supra note 
41, a t  784-86. 
116. Tarr, supra note 6, a t  77-78. 
117. Id. at 76-80. 
118. Miller & Sheers, supra note 36, at  308-10. 
119. Blount v. Department of Educ. & Cultural Sews., 551 A.2d 1377 (Me. 
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and Kentucky1= required the same strict scrutiny standard of 
review under their own constitutions as that required under 
the Federal Constitution. And, as indicated above, Oregon 
determined that its own fundamental law provided a lower 
standard of protection to religious exercise, rejecting the 
compelling state interest test when generally applicable, 
facially neutral laws were challenged? 
The texts of the religious exercise provisions vary among 
these states, and all differ from the federal language. Maine 
and Mississippi are among the twenty states that contain 
provisos qualifying their religious exercise statement? 
Tennessee's language differs significantly from the text of the 
Federal Free Exercise Clause, but does not contain a 
proviso.125 Kentucky's provision offers specific protection 
unavailable under the federal text.lZ6 Oregon's language, 
1988). 
120. In re Brown, 478 So. 2d 1033 (Miss. 1985). 
121. State 'e=c rel. Swam v. Pack, 527 S.W.2d 99 (Tern. 1975), cert. denied, 424 
U.S. 954 (1976). 
122. Kentucky State Bd. for Elementary & Secondary Educ. v. Rudasill, 589 
S.W.2d 877 (Ky. 1979), cert. denied, 446 US. 938 (1980). 
123. Smith v. Employment Div., 721 P.2d 445 (Or. 1986), vacated, 485 U.S. 660 
(1988); Black v. Employment Div., 721 P.2d 451 (Or. 1986), vacated sub nom. 
Employment Div. v. Smith, 485 U.S. 660 (1988); Salem College & Academy, Inc. v. 
Employment Div., 695 P.2d 25 (Or. 1985). 
124. The Mississippi Constitution reads as follows: "the free enjoyment of all 
religious sentiments and the different modes of worship shall be held sacred. The 
rights hereby secured shall not be construed to justify acts . . . dangerous to the 
peace and safety of the state . . . ." MISS. CONST. art. 111, 18. For the Maine 
Constitutional provision, see supra note 25. 
125. The Tennessee Constitution reads: 
That all men have a natural and indefeasible right to worship Almighty 
God according to the dictates of their own conscience; that no man can of 
right be compelled to attend, erect, or support any place of worship, or to 
maintain any minister against his consent; that no human authority can, 
in any case whatever, control or interfere with the rights of conscience; 
and that no preference shall ever be given, by law, to any religious 
establishment or mode of worship. 
TENN. CONST. art. I, $ 3. 
126. The Kentucky Constitution states: 
No preference shall ever be given by law to any religious sect, society or 
denomination; nor to any particular creed, mode of worship or system of 
ecclesiastical polity; nor shall any person be compelled to attend any 
place of worship, to contribute to the erection or maintenance of any such 
place, or to the salary or support of any minister of religion; nor shall 
any man be compelled to send his child to any school to which he may be 
conscientwusly opposed; and the civil rights, privileges or capacities of no 
person shall be taken away, or in any wise diminished or enlarged, on 
account of his belief or disbelief of any religious tenet, dogma or teaching. 
STATE CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION 
which is very detailed, differs from the federal text and 
contains no proviso.127 Mississippi and Kentucky have relied 
entirely on their own constitutions and employed a strict 
scrutiny standard of review to protect the exercise of religion. 
Tennessee and Maine have engaged in analyses of both state 
and federal constitutions and have found the strict scrutiny 
standard of Sherbert required by each document. 
The Maine Supreme Judicial Court, in Blount v. 
Department of Education & Cultural Se r~ ices , ' ~~  interpreted 
its proviso to be consistent with the compelling state 
interesaeast restrictive alternative analysis of the strict 
scrutiny standard of review.12g The Mississippi Supreme 
Court grounded its decision in i n  re Brown13o solely on its 
state constitution but did not focus on the proviso language. 
No human authority shall, in any case whatever, control or interfere with 
the rights of conscience. 
KY. CONST. 5 5 (emphasis added). 
127. The Oregon Constitution provides: "All men shall be secure in the Natural 
right, to worship Almighty God according to the dictates of their own consciences. 
No law shall in any case whatever control the free exercise, and enjoyment of 
religious opinions, or interfere with the rights of conscience." OR. CONST. art. I, 
90 2, 3. 
128. 551 A.2d 1377, 1385 We. 1988). 
129. The court held that neither the federal nor state constitution protected 
home-schooler parents from the state's authority to approve their children's 
educational program. The court first engaged in a federal analysis, using the 
burdenlcompelling interesfleast restrictive alternative test to determine that the 
burden on the Blounts' free exercise was justified by state interests. It then 
entered into analysis of the state constitutional claim. 
The Blounts argued that the provisos in the state text concerning disturbance 
of the public peace and obstruction of religious worship should be read to provide 
even greater protection than the compelling interest standard. They argued that 
the state language so limited the range of governmental interests capable of 
overbalancing religious practice that less protection for the countervailing public 
interests should be afforded when those interests, though compelling, do not 
prevent disturbance of the peace or obstruction of the worship of others. The court 
refused to read the provisos to give greater protection for religious conduct than 
the federal counterpart, but it made clear that the state and federal constitutions 
each independently required a compelling interest4east restrictive alternative test. 
The court concluded 
that the full range of protection afforded the Blounts by the Maine 
Constitution is also available under the United States Constitution . . . . 
Maine's qualifying phrase "provided that that person does not disturb the 
public peace, nor obstruct others in their religious worship" cannot be 
read as giving less weight to "compelling public interests" than does the 
unqualified language of the First Amendment forbidding any "law . . . 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof." 
Id. 
130. 478 So. 2d 1033 (Miss. 1985). 
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Nevertheless, it severely limited the governmental interests 
that  could override religious claims, announcing a strict 
scrutiny standard of review.l3l Tennessee's Constitution has 
neither an obstruction of worship nor a disturbance of peace 
and safety proviso, but the Tennessee Supreme Court in State 
ex rel. Swann v. Packls2 explicitly recognized that "Article 1, 
Section 3 of the Constitution of Tennessee contains a 
substantially stronger guaranty of religious freedoms" than the 
First Amendment contains.133 
131. The court held that the state free exercise provision protected the plaintiff, 
a Jehovah's Witness, from being required to accept a blood transfusion. A blood 
transfusion was ordered for Mattie Brown, the victim of and witness to a violent 
crime, because the state wanted to ensure she lived to testify. The court held that 
the blood transfusion should not have occurred without her consent. The state's 
interest in her testimony did not address any "great and imminent public danger"; 
only "compelling considerations of public safety and dangern can interfere with her 
free exercise rights. Id. at 1039. 
The court's analysis suggests that the state interpretation of what types of 
interests constitute a compelling interest is more limited than the federal 
interpretation, bordering on a clear and present danger test. Although it wrote, "we 
believe [the decision] compelled by a faithfbl application of First Amendment 
jurisprudence," id. at 1039 n.5, the court's decision is grounded solely on its own 
constitution, avoids the federal language of burden and compelling interest, refers 
to federal cases only as examples, and draws distinctions that are not present in 
the federal jurisprudence. "Religiously grounded actions or conduct are often beyond 
the authority of the state to control. Where the religiously grounded 'action' is a 
refusal to act rather than affirmative, overt conduct, the State's authority to 
interfere is virtually non-existent except only in the instance of the grave and 
immediate public danger." Id. at  1037 (citations omitted). 
The court made it clear that the plaintiffs rights would yield only to 
"conflicting rights vested in others" that are expressed in the law, not "mere 
interests." Id. at 1036. Its constitution therefore "prohibits state interference with 
most instances of the free exercise of religion." Id. at 1039. 
132. 527 S.W.2d 99 (Tenn. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 954 (1976). 
133. Id. at 107. In banning snake handling done in religious services as a public 
nuisance, the Tennessee Supreme Court held that under both federal and state 
constitutions a religious practice may be limited, curtailed or restrained to the 
point of outright prohibition, where it involves a clear and present danger to the 
interests of society. "Elhe scales are always weighted in favor of free exercise and 
the state's interest must be compelling; it must be substantial; the danger must be 
clear and present and so grave as to endanger paramount public interests." Id. at  
111. The Court relied on the belieflact distinction and then discussed Cantwell's 
clear and present danger doctrine. Id. at 108 (citing Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 
U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940)). The court also recognized that the new balancing test of 
Sherbert was consistent with its prior law. Id. at 109 (discussing Harden v. State, 
216 S.W.2d 708 (Tenn. 1948)), which upheld the constitutionality of the Tennessee 
Snake Handler's Act in the face of a grave and immediate danger). According to 
the Tennessee high court, Sherbert did not change Harden; it was based on the 
clear and present danger and substantial interest doctrine of Cantwell. Thus, for 
Tennessee, like Mississippi, the standard of review required under the state 
constitution is arguably higher than that of Sherbert. However, the court, while 
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In Kentucky State Board for Elementary & Secondary 
Education v. Rudasill, Kentucky's Supreme Court provided an 
independent state constitutional analysis in its interpretation 
of a religious education provision that has no parallel federal 
- text? In so doing, the court adopted a least restrictive 
alternative test to  give broad operational latitude to church- 
affiliated schools. 
Oregon's consistent use of the state-first approach in state 
constitutional adjudication was applied to free exercise in 1985. 
In that year, Chief Justice Linde wrote the decision in Salem 
College & Academy, Inc. v. Employment ~ i v i s i o n ' ~ ~  that 
applied a minimum rationality test to a generally applicable 
unemployment tax challenged by a religious school.136 The 
court held that the state had not infringed the school's right to  
religious freedom when all similarly situated employers in the 
state were subject to the same tax.ls7 When an obligation is 
recognizing the constitutions as two independent sources, explicitly finds the state 
and federal standards consistent. The T e ~ e s s e e  Court made specific note of its 
textual detail and strength of its religious protections as compared to the federal 
language. In an earlier decision, the high court found the state and federal 
provisions relating to religion "practically synonymous. If anything, our own organic 
law is broader and more comprehensive in its guarantee of worship and freedom of 
conscience, in that 'no preference shall ever be given, by law, to any religious 
establishment or mode of worship.' " Carden v. Bland, 288 S.W.2d 718, 721 (Tern. 
1956) (quoting TENN. CONST. art. I, 8 3). 
134. 589 S.W.2d 877 (Ky. 1979), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 938 (1980). Section 5 of 
the Kentucky Bill of Rights protects parents' interests in directing the religious 
upbringing of children (and conscientious objection to public schools). The court 
wrote, 
[Ilt is obvious that Section 5 of the Kentucky Constitution is more 
restrictive of the power of the state to regulate private and parochial 
schools than is the first amendment to the federal constitution as it has 
been applied to the states. Consequently, the Supremacy Clause . . . does 
not require us to ride with the Federales in order to reach a decision. 
Id. at 879 n.3 (citations omitted). 
After discussing the legislative history, the court found that the state has an 
interest in controlling religious schools to the extent that all schools must prepare 
children for citizenship in a democracy. Religious schools can do this while using 
textbooks and teachers of their choice, and standardized testing can be used to be 
sure they are accomplishing their educational goals. This is essentially a least 
restrictive alternative test. Thus, Kentucky must approve a religious school unless 
the state demonstrates the institution is not a 'school" (i.e., i t  fails to educate 
fiiture citizens as indicated by the standardized testing). 
135. 695 P.2d 25 (Or. 1985). 
136. The court could use its own state constitutional analysis because the 
Supremacy Clause is not applicable where the state runs a federal program that 
Congress has not made obligatory. The court was thus able to develop and apply a 
lower standard of protedion to  religion. Id. at 34. 
137. Central to the court's reasoning was the notion that the tax was tailored to 
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generally applicable, the court indicated, there is no need to 
engage in any balancing to determine whether the state has a 
compelling interest. Rather, the legislature is free to exempt 
religious schools from the generally applicable statute requiring 
the unemployment tax payment, as long as all similarly 
situated religious schools are treated the same. But the court, 
it concluded, will not mandate such an exemption.ls8 
A year later, in the Oregon Supreme Court's first decision 
in Smith v. Employment D i ~ i s i o n ' ~ ~  and Black u. Employment 
Division1" (companion cases), the court expanded Salem 
College's holding on taxation to include general and neutral 
regulations. Since a generally applicable, facially neutral tax 
law had already been held constitutional as applied to  religious 
 organization^,^^' the Oregon court went further and ruled 
that the denial of unemployment benefits through the 
operation of a generally applicable statute that is neutral both 
on its face and as applied did not violate the Oregon religious 
freedom provision. 14' 
the non-religious, economic aspects of the school's activities, and therefore the 
school was unaffected in its religious aspects. The taxes are not flat taxes on 
religious activities; they affect the economic and social aspect of the schools, not 
any activities peculiarly characteristic of schools or religious programs; the burdens 
are simply financial and clerical. Id. at 34-35. Thus, compliance with general 
financial obligations was no different from a required compliance with a host of 
other secular health, safety and licensing regulations. 
138. Id. at 40-41. 
139. 721 P.2d 445 (Or. 1986), vacated, 485 U.S. 660 (1988). Plaintiff Smith, 
discharged for misconduct from his job with a private drug-counseling organization 
because he had ingested peyote in a religious ceremony of the Native American 
Church, argued that the resulting denial of unemployment benefits burdened his 
free exercise of religion. The state rule requires denial of unemployment benefits 
whenever the job is terminated for misconduct as defined by the employer. 
140. 721 P.2d 451 (Or. 1986), vacated sub mm. Employment Div. v. Smith, 485 
U.S. 660 (1988). 
141. Salem College & Academy, Inc. v. Employment Div., 695 P.2d 25, 34, 39 
(Or. 1985). 
142. The court held that the unemployment compensation statute and state rule 
regarding termination for misconduct are "completely neutral toward religious 
motivations for misconduct. If the statute or rule did discriminate for or against 
claimants for worshipping as they chose, we would be faced with an entirely 
different issue." Smith, 721 P.2d at  448. The parallel between the two cases of 
Salem College and Smith to the two cases of Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Board 
of Equalization, 493 U.S. 378 (1990) and Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 
872 (1990) is uncanny. But it does not seem that a law targeting religion is 
automatically subject to  strict scrutiny. In Cooper v. Eugene School District, 723 
P.2d 298 (Or. 1986), where a religious garb law targeted religion, the court held 
that a teacher could be denied the right to dress in the distinctive attire of the 
Sikh religion because that was necessary to maintain religious neutrality in public 
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However, the Oregon Supreme Court provided no textual 
analysis in either Salem College or Smith to  justify its 
departure from the Sherbert standard. Oregon's constitutional 
language, on its face, is even stronger than the Tennessee 
Constitution's text, in that it protects religious exercise and 
enjoyment of religious opinion in addition t o  conscience and 
worship. And yet Tennessee found that its constitutional 
provisions were "substantially stronger" than the federal 
language and required strict scrutiny. '" Obviously, text alone 
will not be dispositive. 
The Oregon decision in Smith reintroduced the secular 
regulation rule into the national dialogue. Ultimately, the U.S. 
Supreme Court adopted it and thereby restored an earlier 
understanding of religious liberty, the very same 
understanding it had required states to abandon decades ago. 
, As a result, the scope and nature of religious liberty are once 
again contingent upon the states. And it is to them that the 
nation must look for definitions of religious liberty. 
What makes it possible today for state supreme courts t o  
interpret their constitutions t o  require a strict scrutiny 
standard of judicial review when fifiy years ago the same 
constitutions were interpreted to uphold virtually every 
governmental action affecting religious practice? If the texts of 
these documents so obviously embody protection for religious 
exercise, why didn't courts see the obvious fifty, or even thirty, 
years ago? Perhaps the "obvious" was a nation intolerant of 
religious pluralism and confident that legislation reflected its 
unassailable viewpoint. In that context, the secular regulation 
rule served as a framework for persecution; now, after Smith, it 
threatens to become a framework for extreme marginalization 
of religious conduct, and for a severe form of statist uniformity. 
The secular regulation rule failed before; it is now all the more 
incompatible with increases in religious pluralism and in 
government regulation. When states begin to look at their texts 
through the informed lens of recent history, they should see 
schools; the teacher's expression was found incompatible with performance of the 
official role. Oregon has not employed the balancing test, but it has independently 
used an "incompatibility with teaching" test. Id. at 311. 
143. See supra note 132-133 and accompanying text. 
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, 
something different from what they saw fifty years ago. 
The central example of this "new reading" in the post- 
Smith era is the understanding of the provisos as the 
enumeration of state interests capable of overbalancing free 
exercise. Before and during the Sherbert years, the provisos 
failed to impress most state courts as a source of protection for 
religious liberty. State courts apparently understood them t o  
express the state's power to restrict religion and thus to justify 
the secular regulation rule.'" Commentators in the 1960s 
considered the proviso language "probably no more than 
precatory in nature. Many of the states have not thought it 
necessary to include it in their constitutions. Yet the great 
majority in one fashion or another have made positive efforts t o  
restrict certain religious  practice^."'^^ After Sherbert, states 
with provisos in their constitutions did not consider them to  be 
consistent with the new, higher standard. Writing during the 
Sherbert years, Professor Tam stated that the language of these 
provisos "seems to afford less protection for religiously 
motivated conduct than is now available under the federal 
con~titution."~~~ In fact, he went so far as to suggest that the 
failure to develop state constitutional law and the heavy 
reliance on federal doctrine under the Sherbert rule "may 
reflect the judgment that, given the police power exception 
found in many state constitutions and precedent, state 
constitutions offer less protection of religiously-motivated 
conduct than the first a~nendment."'~' 
Professor Michael McConnell has reasoned instead that 
these provisos recognize the acceptability of religious 
exemptions from general laws by specifying those classes of 
laws from which exemptions are not available. If the language 
meant that any law could override the free exercise of religion, 
a proviso would completely swallow up the statement of 
protected rights.14' The only plausible interpretation, then, is 
144. Tarr writes, "Relying on such constitutional language, state courts have 
generally sustained state laws challenged as violative of religious liberty." Tam, 
supra note 90, at 23. 
145. ANTIEAU ET AL., supra note 60, at 67. 
146. Tam, supra note 90, at 23. 
147. Id. at 24. 
148. McConnell, supra note 37, at 1455-66. McConnell also detects in these 
provisos historical justification for religious exemptions, finding evidence that 
exemptions from generally applicable laws were a natural part of the scheme from 
the time of the original drafting of state constitutions. Id. at 1461-66. 
The inclusion of a balance on the face of the constitutional provision is not 
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that free exercise can be infringed only by specific categories of 
governmental interests. Laws that address unenumerated 
categories cannot likewise infringe upon religious exercise; 
religious exemptions are necessarily required from such laws. 
State courts departing from Smith have arrived a t  the same 
conclusion, thereby giving special weight to the proviso 
language. 
Since the current federal constitutional interpretation of 
free exercise is unreceptive to religious exemptions, state 
constitutional claims and arguments will inevitably become 
more common.149 Thus, each state ultimately will have to 
make the substantive determination under its own constitution 
whether to follow the new, drastically lower standard of Smith, 
or to continue to follow the higher Sherbert standard. Of 
particular concern is a group of thirty-five states that  
considered state and federal religious protections to be 
coextensive during the Sherbert years, employing the Sherbert 
analysis "to such an extent that it is unclear whether their 
state constitutions would independently support a compelling 
governmental interest test. These states may or may not switch 
their level of scrutiny to coincide with the federal judiciary's 
new approach."'" The four states that required a high level 
of review under their own constitutions prior to Smith will 
likely continue to employ strict scrutiny post-Smith. Maine's 
high court has already done so,l5' and Tennessee, Kentucky 
and Mississippi will likely f01low.l~~ 
A. States Following Smith's Minimal Scrutiny 
Two state supreme courts have explicitly decided t o  follow 
limited to these types of provisos. Over forty states guarantee protection to speech 
on any subject, but then declare that a person may be held responsible for the 
abuse of that right. COLLINS, supra note 36, at  2502. 
149. Laycock, Summary, supra note 15, at  854. For discussion of a parallel shift 
to state litigation in the Establishment Clause context, see G. Alan Tarr, Religion 
Under State Constitutions, 496 ~ W A L S  AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. March 1988, 
65, 74-75. 
150. Miller & Sheers, supra note 36, at  310-11. 
151. Rupert v. City of Portland, 605 A.2d 63 (Me. 1992). 
152. If we assume that those preSmith states that protected religion under 
their own constitutions will continue to do so, and combine them with the post- 
Smith states that have refused to follow Smith, we arrive at  a total of seven: 
Tennessee, Kentucky, Mississippi, Minnesota, Massachusetts, Maine, and 
Washington. Against those seven we have three states following Smith's minimum 
rationality standard of review: Oregon, Vermont and Iowa. 
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the federal lead in Smith: Oregon and Vermont.ls3 When, in 
1990, the U.S. Supreme Court remanded Employment Division 
u. Smith to the Oregon Supreme Court for implementation of 
the final decision, the Oregon Supreme Court welcomed the 
federal adoption of the lower standard of review and therefore 
maintained the state constitutional position announced four 
years earlier when it had first considered Smith.'" 
Similarly, Vermont also decided explicitly not to interpret 
its own constitution in a way that expands the scope of free 
exercise 15ghts.l~~ In State u. DeLaBruere,'" Vermont's Su- 
preme Court chose to follow federal constitutional analysis as 
set forth in Smith. The case involved parents who were home- 
schooling their children and who refused to comply with certain 
state regulations. Under Smith, these facts fall within the so- 
called "hybrid" category which involves a constitutional right in 
addition to the free exercise of religion-here, the rights of 
parents to control the religious upbringing of their children. 
Hybrid cases continue to enjoy strict scrutiny review by the 
courts, and so- the Vermont Supreme Court required the state 
to show a compelling governmental interest implemented 
through the least restrictive alternative. The chosen standard 
of review is not a t  issue here. For purposes of this article, the 
significant move of the state court was that it  declined to em- 
ploy the strict scrutiny standard under its own constitution and 
153. Employment Div. v. Smith, 799 P.2d 148 (Or. 1990) (on remand to the Ore- 
gon Supreme Court after the U.S. Supreme Court issued its decision in Employ- 
ment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990)); State v. DeLaBruere, 577 A.2d 254 (Vt. 
1990). 
154. Employment Div. v. Smith, 799 P.2d 148 (Or. 1990). Oregon originally de- 
nied compensation because the unemployment compensation statute was facially 
neutral, and generally .applicable. The U.S. Supreme Court would deny compensa- 
tion because the criminal statute was facially neutral and generally applicable. 
155. The Vermont Constitution states: 
That all men have a natural and unalienable right, to worship Almighty 
God, according to the dictates of their own consciences and understand- 
ings, as in their opinion shall be regulated by the word of God; and that 
no man ought to, or of right can be compelled to attend any religious 
worship, or erect or support any place of worship, or maintain any minis- 
ter, contrary to the dictates of his conscience, nor can any man be justly 
deprived or abridged of any civil right as a citizen, on account of his 
religious sentiments, or peculiar mode of religious worship; and that no 
authority can, or ought to be vested in, or assumed by, any power what- 
ever, that shall in any case interfere with, or in any manner control the 
rights of conscience, in the free exercise of religious worship. 
VT. CONST. ch. 1, art. 3. 
156. 577 A.2d 254 (Vt. 1990). 
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instead employed it under Smith. 
Iowa might be considered the third state to have adopted 
the Smith analysis under its own constitution, yet this remains 
unclear. Unlike Oregon and Vermont, each of which stated that 
its state constitution would not provide for a higher standard of 
judicial review in free exercise cases, the Iowa Supreme Court's 
opinion in Hope Evangelical Lutheran Church u. Iowa Depart- 
ment of Revenue & Finance makes no such statement? In 
this case a church challenged a use tax assessment on the 
purchase of out-of-state church supplies on both federal and 
state constitutional grounds. Interestingly, the language of free 
exercise protection in the Iowa Constitution is identical to  that 
of the First Amendment.lss However, after reproducing the 
language of both constitutions, the court proceeded to uphold 
the assessment as a valid exercise of state taxing authority on 
wholly federal grounds without separately analyzing the state 
constitutional pro~ision.'~~ Thus, the court relied exclusively 
on federal precedent to find that compliance with this generally 
applicable, facially neutral tax law was no different from corn- 
pliance with other generally applicable, facially neutral laws. 
This case is a classic example of a court's failure to clarify 
whether its judgment rests on federal grounds alone or on both 
state and federal grounddg If the Iowa court intended to in- 
terpret its state constitutional provision to be coextensive with 
the federal interpretation, then Iowa could be added to those 
states refusing to find a higher standard of review in their 
fundamental law. On the other hand, the lack of clarity regard- 
ing the specific constitutional basis for its decision could mean 
that it still retains the opportunity to make an independent 
judgment about free exercise under its own constitution in 
areas outside the tax field. 
157. 463 N.W.2d 76 (Iowa 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1585 (1991). 
158. The Iowa Constitution reads as follows: 
The General Assembly shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; nor shall any person be 
compelled to attend any place of worship, pay tithes, taxes, or other rates 
for building or repairing places of worship, or the maintenance of any 
minister or ministry. 
IOWA CONST. art. I, 9 3. 
159. The court applied the Supreme Court's Swaggart analysis to reject the free 
exercise claim in this case. Hope, 463 N.W.2d a t  80 (citing Jimmy Swaggart Minis- 
tries v. Board of Equalization, 493 U.S. 378 (1990)). Although Swaggart is applied 
(because of the factual similarities), Smith is mentioned. Id. 
160. See supra notes 50-55 and accompanying text. 
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B. States Departing fiorn Smith's Minim1 Scrutiny 
Minnesota and Washington have adopted the federal lan- 
guage of "compelling state interesty' and "least restrictive alter- 
native" to interpret their provisos. Only the state's interest in 
preventing licentiousness and ensuring peace and safety can 
override religious freedom, which mirrors Sherbert's require- 
ment that there be a compelling state interest to override free 
exercise rights. The Minnesota Supreme Court held that 
Minnesota's citizens are "afforded greater protection for reli- 
gious liberties against governmental action under the state 
constitution than under the first amendment of the federal 
constitution" because the federal language precludes only the 
"prohibition" of free exercise, while the state language "pre- 
cludes an infringement on or an interference with religious 
freedom and limits the permissible countervailing interests of 
the g~vernment."'~~ 
In applying these notions to actual cases, the Minnesota 
Supreme Court employs a highly structured balancing analysis. 
For example, in Hershberger 11, Amish citizens sought exemp- 
tion from the state's "slow-moving vehicle" law?' Rather 
than place an orange triangle on their buggies, the Amish 
(whose religious convictions prevent them from using gaudy 
colors and symbols) requested that they be permitted to outline 
their buggies in silver reflecting tape. The state conceded that 
the reflecting tape was equally suitable for safety, but wanted 
to preserve uniformity. The court did not simply accept the 
assertion by the state that safety was involved to override the 
denial of a religious exemption. It had indicated in Cooper v. 
French that the "plain language" of the proviso "commands 
[the] court to weigh the competing  interest^."'^^ The court 
borrowed this "weighing" analysis from federal free exercise 
precedent, stating that the proviso "invites the court to balance 
competing values in a manner that the compelling state inter- 
est test we relied on [earlier] ably articulates: . . . the state 
should be required to demonstrate that public safety cannot be 
achieved by proposed alternative means."lM If any accommo- 
dation can be reached through the use of a less restrictive al- 
161. State v. Hershberger, 462 N.W.2d 393, 397 (Minn. 1990). 
162. Id. For procedural history, see supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text. 
163. Cooper v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2, 9 (Minn. 1990). 
164. Hershberger, 462 N.W.2d at 398. 
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ternative that will enable both the religious interest and the 
state interest to be protected, such an accommodation must be 
accepted.lB5 Only if the state can show that safety cannot be 
achieved through any less restrictive alternative will the reli- 
gious liberty interest yield. In the strictest sense then, to in- 
fringe permissibly upon a religious practice, the practice must 
be fully inconsistent with public safety.lB6 
In a plurality opinion in Cooper u. French, the Minnesota 
Supreme Court also upheld the rights of a landlord to deny an 
apartment to an  unmarried cohabiting couple on the grounds 
that such a rental would violate the landlord's religious 
 conviction^.'^' The court held that protecting cohabitation 
was not a compelling interest sufficient to override the 
landlord's religious exercise. 
The Washington Supreme Court also interprets its proviso 
to mean that religious practice can be outweighed only by a 
compelling state interest implemented through the least re- 
strictive alternative. In First Covenant Church II,lB8 a church 
challenged the designation of the exterior of its house of wor- 
ship as a landmark. The court found that the designation did 
indeed burden religious practice under both the federal and 
state constitutions and that historic preservation did not em- 
body a compelling governmental interest suMicient to justify 
the burden. 16' 
Justice Utter of the Washington Supreme Court, in his 
concurring opinion in First Covenant Church II, was concerned 
165. Id. at 399. 
166. Minnesota vigorously develops the least-restrictive-alternative element of the 
strict scrutiny standard. Before a compelling interest can interfere with free exer- 
cise, the religious practice must be filly inconsistent with the state's interest. Any 
accommodation of both religious practice and the state's goal must be accepted. 
This shares similarities with the analysis of Kentucky and Te~essee .  See supra 
notes 132-134 and accompanying text. A required choice of the least restrictive 
alternative leads Kentucky to grant broad autonomy to church schools, and calls on 
Tennessee's Supreme Court to analyze numerous alternatives to the outright prohi- 
bition on snake handling before making its final determination. 
167. Cooper, 460 N.W.2d at 9. 
168. 840 P.2d 174 (Wash. 1992). For procedural history, see supra notes 33-34 
and accompanying text. 
169. The Washington Supreme Court relied on an earlier state case to determine 
what constitutes a compelling state interest. See State ex rel. Holcomb v. 
Armstrong, 239 P.2d 545, 548 (Wash. 1952) (only a danger which is "clear and 
present, grave and immediate" justifies infringement of free exercise of religion, 
where government's interest in protecting specified persons from disease outweighs 
individual's right to refuse an x-ray). 
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that the court had unnecessarily adopted federal concepts of 
compelling state interest and least restrictive alternative, and 
even the concept of "balancing." He emphasized that the specif- 
ic language of the Washington Constitution expressly limited 
the governmental interests that may outweigh the otherwise 
absolute right to liberty: preventing licentiousness and ensur- 
ing peace and safety. Since historic preservation involves nei- 
ther interest of the state, the court need not reach the issue of 
whether the state's interest is ~ompelling. '~~ 
While this interpretive method did not command a majori- 
ty in Washington, it did in Massachusetts. Massachusetts' 
constitutional proviso precludes government interference with 
religious freedom unless the religious practice disturbs the 
public peace or obstructs others in their religious worship. In 
Society of Jesus u. Boston Landmarks Commi~sion,'~' the Je- 
suits challenged the designation of the interior of their church 
as a landmark. The historic preservation commission had be- 
come involved in the placement of altars; because of this, the 
Jesuits claimed a constitutional violation. In agreeing that the 
state constitution was violated, the high court set out a two- 
tiered test. If government is found to have restrained worship 
"in the manner and season most agreeable to the dictates of 
conscience," the court looks to see if the religiously motivated 
conduct disturbs the peace or the worship of others. If it does 
not, the government regulation must yield. Therefore, the 
Massachusetts Constitution provides a categorical prohibition 
against governmental restraints of religious worship when the 
"escape clauses" are inapplicable.'" This is very similar to 
Washington Supreme Court Justice Utter's suggested ap- 
p r 0 a ~ h . l ~ ~  The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court went 
on to say that in the event the religious practice does disturb 
the peace or the worship of others, the court is required to 
engage in a balancing of the religious and state  interest^.'?^ 
Note again the sensitivity to religion: even when the proviso is 
applicable, the state regulation may still be required to yield. 
170. First Covenant Church, 840 P.2d at 191-92 (Utter, J., concurring). 
171. 564 N.E.2d 571 (Mass. 1990). 
172. Id. at 574. 
173. See supra notes 168-170 and accompanying text. 
174. The constitutionality of a law that would interfere with the exercise of 
religion must depend on a balancing of the State's interest in the law's enforce- 
ment against the individual's interest in practicing his religion as he chooses." 
Commonwealth v. Nissenbaum, 536 N.E.2d 592, 595 (Mass. 1989). 
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Moreover, although no balance was required under its test, the 
court nonetheless offered its judgment that state historic pres- 
ervation "is not ~ ~ c i e n t l y  compelling to justify restraints on 
the free exercise of religi~n."'~~ 
The Maine Supreme Court's discussion of its state constitu- 
tion in Rupert u. City of P ~ r t l a n d ' ~ ~  is not as fully developed 
as in these other decisions because in Rupert the religious 
claimant lost. The plaintiff argued that he smoked marijuana 
only for religious purposes, and therefore sought return of the 
pipe that police had confiscated from him. The court continued 
to  employ the language developed in the Sherbert federal con- 
text, finding under its state constitution that Maine had a 
compelling governmental interest and no less restrictive alter- 
native that would avoid the burden placed on plaintiff.17' Un- 
der its separate federal analysis, the Court held that the state 
satisfies Smith's lower standard because the criminal statute 
under which the pipe was taken is generally applicable.17' 
The California Supreme Court currently faces the question 
of what standard of review to  employ in free exercise cases. In 
Donahue v. Fair Employment & Housing Commission, a land- 
lord refused to rent to an unmarried, cohabiting couple.179 
The couple sued under rent discrimination laws. The appellate 
court held that a religious exemption from those laws was 
required under the state constitution because religion was 
burdened and because non-discrimination against unmarried 
cohabitors is not a compelling state interest justifymg the bur- 
den.lso The appellate court also found that prior to  Smith, the 
California Supreme Court had repeatedly used the compelling 
interest test based upon both federal and state constitutional 
grounds and had considered the interpretations of state and 
federal free exercise coextensive. The appellate court held that 
despite the change in federal interpretation after Smith, the 
pre-Smith compelling interest test (which incorporates the least 
175. Society of Jesus, 564 N.E.2d at 574. 
176. 605 A.2d 63 (Me. 1992). 
177. Id. at 66-67. 
178. Id. at 67-68. 
179. Donahue v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 32 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1991), reh'g granted & opinion superseded, 825 P.2d 766 (1992). The Donahue 
case is factually identical to Cooper v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2 (Minn. 1990), in 
which a plurality opinion of the state's high court rejected Smith and applied its 
own constitutional law to find protection for religion that explicitly exceeded the 
federal level. 
180. Donahue, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 33. 
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restrictive alternative requirement) continues to be the control- 
ling analysis under state constitutional law.lgl 
One of the most significant aspects of this independent 
religious exercise jurisprudence, both during the Sherbert years 
(in Tennessee, Kentucky, Mississippi and Maine) and in the 
post-Smith period (in Minnesota, Massachusetts, Maine and 
Washington), is the more sophisticated treatment of religious 
activity than in the federal arena. After Sherbert and its imme- 
diate progeny, the U.S. Supreme Court became increasingly 
wooden in  its applications of the Sherbert approach, under- 
standing "burden" in overly narrow terms, or too readily fmd- 
ing a compelling state interest. Often the institutional and 
associational aspects of religion were not fully appreciated a s  
something to be protected.ls2 In addition, Smith's rejection of 
judicially mandated religious exemptions has completely ig- 
nored the dynamic interaction between church and culture, and 
thus -threatens the ability of religious groups to make the theo- 
logical choice of the appropriate type of interaction with the 
culture, whether friendly, critical, engaged, or withdrawn.1g3 
State interpretation has been far more hospitable to these 
associational and ecclesiological issues and generally more open 
to the complexity of religion and the variety of its forms. Most 
significantly, in none of the state cases is religion understood 
as narrowly as i t  came to be in federal cases-that is, as obedi- 
ence to a set of rules. Rather, most of the state cases address 
group rights: the free exercise rights of churches to design their 
buildings, inside and out, free of historic preservation re- 
strictions (Washington, Massachusetts); the free exercise rights 
of the Amish to use alternative safety measures when riding 
their buggies in public streets (Minnesota); and the free exer- 
cise rights of church schools to choose their own teachers and 
textbooks (Kentucky). These cases have taken the integrity of 
the religious community as a paramount value. Even the snake 
181. Id. at  39-41. "The California Supreme Court has not yet addressed the 
application of Smith. Unless the California Supreme Court adopts the approach in 
Smith, even if we found the approach in Smith preferable, we are bound to contin- 
ue to follow the balancing test and compelling state interest analysis as a matter 
of state constitutional law." Id. a t  40. 
182. See Glendon & Yanes, supra note 7, a t  537 (advocating a "structural" ap- 
proach to religious liberty that accounts for the "institutional and associational, as 
well as  the individual, aspects of religious freedom"). 
183. See Angela C. Carmella, A Theological Critique of Free Exercise Jurispru- 
dence, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 782, 784-95 (1992). 
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handlers of Tennessee, whose practice was ultimately held 
unlawful, were given the most careful attention. Moreover, 
state courts have recognized and protected manifestations of 
religious life that are deeply connected with the wider society. 
For example, Minnesota and California have permitted land- 
lords to refuse rentals to cohabiting couples, thereby protecting 
religious liberty in a commercial context.'" 
States now have the opportunity to engage in the interpre- 
tation of their own constitutions and thus to enter the decision- 
al dialogue with other state and federal courts, not only to 
"restore" the pre-Smith standard, but to reshape it as well. In 
so doing, state constitutional interpretation might avoid some 
of the weaknesses of the pre-Smith jurisprudence, in particular 
its overly narrow interpretation of burden and its overly gener- 
ous interpretation of compelling state interest.lS5 State consti- 
tutional interpretation has the potential to better address the 
associational and institutional aspects of free exercise,1s6 and 
thus might ensure that the church-culture interaction, and the 
ecclesiological judgments that flow from that interaction, are 
better protected from unwarranted governmental interfer- 
ence. lg7 
C. Encouraging Departure fron Smith 
This article has emphasized the use of provisos as textual 
sources of "compelling governmental interest" requirements (or 
of some other interpretation that limits the types of state inter- 
ests that can override religious exercise). This emphasis, how- 
ever, is not intended to  suggest that interpretive independence 
is limited to states with provisos. More than half of the states 
in the nation have no such language, and other states, like 
Iowa, have texts mirroring the federal language. Even without 
proviso language, textual differences alone provide a tremen- 
dous source of independent interpretation. Such was the case 
in Tennessee and Kentucky, which, during the Sherbert years, 
184. Donahue v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 32 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1991), reh'g granted & opinion superseded, 825 P.2d 766 (1992); Cooper v. 
French, 460 N.W.2d 2, 9 (Minn. 1990). 
185. For discussion of some of those weaknesses, see Glendon & Yanes, supra 
note 7; see also Carmella, supra note 183, at 795-99. 
186. Glendon & Yanes, supra note 7, focus on these aspects of free exercise. For 
many examples of the ways in which state constitutional interpretation can more 
authentically serve all areas of the law, see Hartigan, supra note 78, passim. 
187. See Carmella, supra note 17. 
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found an independent basis for strict scrutiny.188 As for those 
states whose language mirrors that of the Federal Free Exer- 
cise Clause, nothing precludes them from making an indepen- 
dent analysis. Three years ago the federal language was inter- 
preted by the U.S. Supreme Court to require strict scrutiny 
review; simply because the Court has departed from the earlier 
understanding does not compel the states to follow suit. Here 
the debate between relational and non-relational approaches to 
state court interpretation becomes significant: a non-relational 
approach affords state courts the appropriate freedom to give 
meaning to their texts independent of federal choices.18s The 
states with provisos may be the leaders in the movement to 
depart from Smith, but nothing prevents the interpretive au- 
tonomy of other states. 
States yet to make a decision about Smith should not fear 
that a lack of interpretive autonomy in the past compels them 
now to  follow federal precedent. Minnesota and Massachusetts 
never exhibited interpretive independence before Smith; Wash- 
ington did, but in a very limited way. The fact that the states' 
interpretations of their own constitutions are shaped by the 
Sherbert analysis leads more persuasively to  the conclusion 
that the Sherbert analysis remains the state constitutional 
interpretation, even though the current federal interpretation 
has changed. To conclude otherwise would mean that any 
change by the U.S. Supreme Court automatically amends state 
constitutions and their interpretations.lS0 As Justice 
188. See supra notes 133-134 and accompanying text. See also Miller & Sheers, 
supra note 36, at 311-18, for a comprehensive discussion of available textual argu- 
ments. 
189. See Miller & Sheers, supra note 36, at 311-18. 
190. Thanks to Professor Laycock for this observation. This is precisely the mis- 
take the Vermont Supreme Court made in State v. DeLaBruere, 577 A.2d 254 (Vt. 
1990). The court discussed constitutions and cases from more than a dozen states, 
which, at first glance, looks like a rather sophisticated treatment of texts from 
sister states. But upon closer review, it serves to make only one point: during the 
Sherbert years, state religious exercise provisions were typically understood as 
coextensive with the Federal Free Exercise Clause. It concludes unnecessarily from 
this fad that it therefore should now continue to follow the federal analysis and 
not invoke its own constitution. But it could have concluded just as easily that if 
its own constitution has been understood to support a strict scrutiny standard in 
the past, now that the federal doctrine has changed, it can continue to understand 
its state constitution to require strict scrutiny. Its analysis of sister states is fur- 
ther undermined because two states it placed on its listMinnesota and 
Maine-have explicitly departed from the federal standard since Smith. See supra 
notes 21-37 and accompanying text. In fad, Maine had already established an 
independent standard, but the Vermont Supreme Court misread Blount v. Depart- 
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Pashman of the New Jersey Supreme Court wrote, 
The United States Supreme Court, by defining liberties in a 
more limited manner, cannot prevent future decisions by 
state supreme courts that interpret state constitutions to go 
further. If this were true, the Supreme Court would effective- 
ly be the final arbiter, not only of federal constitutional law, 
but of much state constitutional law. Yet both the Supreme 
Court and this Court have consistently rejected this posi- 
tion. lQ1 
Minnesota gave no indication during the Sherbert years 
that it might depart from federal precedent. After In re Jenison 
was remanded in 1963, M i ~ e s o t a  followed the lead set by the 
U.S. Supreme Court, either interpreting its own constitution in  
tandem with the federal interpretation or ignoring it complete- 
ly. In fact, Hershberger I was based solely on the First Amend- 
ment.lg2 Only a dissenting opinion in a 1985 decision argued 
for a more expansive protection of free exercise rights under 
the state constitution on the grounds that the text of 
Minnesota's provision is stronger.lg3 
Similarly, Massachusetts had no prior history of departing 
from Supreme Court precedent in the free exercise area. In 
fact, Justice Wilkins of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial 
Court wrote in 1980 that "[tlhe pervasive impact of the Su- 
preme Court's treatment of the freedom of religion under the 
first amendment seemingly has made unnecessary any consid- 
eration of the scope of article 2 in recent decades."lN As late 
as 1989 its high court wrote that federal analysis 
aids us in analyzing the scope of religious freedom under our 
own Constitution . . . . While it is possible that, in the future, 
we may conclude that there are circumstances in which art. 2 
provides protection for religious practices not protected by the 
ment of Education & Cultural Services, 551 A.2d 1377 (Me. 1988). 
191. Right to Choose v. Byrne, 450 A.2d 925, 948-49 (N.J. 1982) (Pashman, J., 
concurring in part, dissenting in part). In the speech context, see State v. Schmid, 
423 A.2d 615 (N.J. 1980); in the unlawful search context, see State v. Hunt, 450 
A.2d 952 (N.J. 1982). 
192. State v. Hershberger, 444 N.W.2d 282 (Mim. 1989), vacated, 495 U.S. 901 
(1990). See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text. 
193. McClure v. Sports & Health Club, 370 N.W.2d 844, 873-75 (Minn. 1985) 
(Peterson, J., dissenting). 
194. Herbert P. Wilkins, Judicial Deatment of the Massachusetts Declaration of 
Rights in Relation to Cognate Provisions of the United States Constitution, 14 SUF- 
FOLK U. L. REV. 887, 897 (1980). 
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First Amendment as construed and applied by Federal courts, 
we perceive nothing in the language or history of art. 2 that 
suggests that art. 2 affords more protection in connection with 
[the religious practice in this case] than does the First 
Amendment. 19'
Washington has a history of sensitivity to its own constitu- 
tional provisions in the immediate post-incorporation era. In 
1943, when a Jehovah's Witness flag-salute case came before it, 
the Washington Supreme Court decided emphatically not to 
follow the U.S. Supreme Court's example in Minersville School 
District v. Gobitis.lg6 Washington's decision in Bolling v. Su- 
perior Courtlg7 came down nearly six months before West Vir- 
ginia Board of Education u. Barnettelg8 overruled Gobitis. 
The Washington Supreme Court was aware that support for 
Gobitis had eroded on the U.S. Supreme Court, that the federal 
district court in Barnette had refused to recognize Gobitis as 
controlling, and that the Kansas Supreme Court had recently 
found expanded religious protection under its own constitu- 
tion.lg9 Rather than anticipate a federal turnaround, howev- 
er, the state court based its decision solely on its state constitu- 
tional protections in order to announce a decision that would be 
stable and final despite fluctuations a t  the federal level. After 
this case, Washington followed the lead of the U.S. Supreme 
Court, interpreting its own constitution in tandem with the 
federal interpretation, but it  continued to provide a robust 
interpretation of free exercise within the federal framework. In 
its 1982 decision in City of Sumner v. First Baptist 
for instance, the state's highest court required the type of ac- 
commodation that Minnesota demanded in Hershberger 11: if 
any accommodation can be reached through the use of a less 
restrictive alternative that will serve both the religious interest 
and the state interest, it must be accepted. Relying heavily on 
195. Commonwealth v. Nissenbaum, 536 N.E.2d 592, 595 (Mass. 1989). 
196. 310 U.S. 586 (1940). 
197. 133 P.2d 803 (Wash. 1943). 
198. 319 US.  624 (1943). 
199. The Washington Supreme Court said in Bolling, "Under all the circumstanc- 
es, [Gobitis] can scarcely be deemed to have become authoritative." Bolling, 133 
P.2d at 808. 
200. 639 P.2d 1358 (Wash. 1982). Enforcement of the building code against the 
church school would have resulted in its closing. The court therefore held that the 
municipality must attempt to accommodate the church school by relaxing its stan- 
dards while still meeting the goals of fire safety for children. 
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Sumner, the court in First Covenant Church I based its deci- 
sion in favor of the church on a single, vigorous interpretation 
of both the First Amendment and article 1, section 11.201 
Thus, on the eve of Smith, only Maine had explicitly artic- 
ulated a separate standard of review under its own constitu- 
t i ~ n . ~ ' ~  Minnesota, Massachusetts, and Washington had as- 
sumed that their state free exercise protection was redundant 
and coextensive with that of the federal constitution. This is 
the current position of thirty-five states?O3 all of which pos- 
sess the interpretive autonomy to depart from Smith, just as 
these states have done. 
VI. FREE EXERCISE AND ESTABLISHMENT CONCEPTS: 
STATE AND FEDERAL 
Professor Mary Ann Glendon and Raul Yanes have written 
about the need to analyze the relationships within and among 
texts.204 Applying their concerns to the issues raised in this 
article, one must analyze developments in state free exercise 
jurisprudence in relation to  establishment texts within the 
state document. The same analysis is also needed when con- 
sidering the relationship between state and federal texts. A 
vigorous expansion of religious exemptions under a strict SCN- 
tiny standard of judicial review is, I submit, fully compatible 
with these other texts. 
State courts have -been far more comfortable departing 
from federal precedent in the area of state establishment provi- 
sions than their analyses of free exercise suggest.205 Since 
states have had considerable experience in developing their 
own jurisprudence in the establishment area, they ought not be 
reluctant t o  do the same in the free exercise area. In fact, the 
major implication of independent interpretation of state reli- 
gion provisions is the opportunity to develop a comprehensive 
and coherent religious liberty doctrine, one which integrates 
201. First Covenant Church v. City of Seattle, 787 P.2d 1352 (Wash.), vacated, 
111 S. Ct. 1097 (1990). See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text. 
202. Maine was among the handfbl of states that held during the Sherbert years 
that its own constitution required the burdenhmpelling interestfleast restrictive 
alternative test; but this decision was rendered quite recently-1988. Blount v. 
Department of Educ. & Cultural Servs., 551 A.2d 1377 (Me. 1988). 
203. See supra note 150 and accompanying text. 
204. See generally Glendon & Yanes, supra note 7. 
205. See FREIsEN, supra note 45, $5 4.01-4.05. 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I993 
the treatment of free exercise and establishment issues.206 
The language of the state constitutional texts clearly sug- 
gests such an integrated analysis. In fact, the wording and 
placement of establishment provisions in state constitutions 
show that they were intended to promote freedom of religious 
exercise. They do this by prohibiting compulsory church atten- 
dance, compulsory support of ministers or places of worship, 
state preferences for particular sects, societies or denomina- 
tions, and state support for any particular creed, mode of wor- 
ship or system of ecclesiastical polity.207 In addition, although 
the provisions provide tax exemptions for religious organiza- 
tions, they also prohibit public funds from going directly to 
religious organizations, societies or The U.S. Su- 
preme Court in Everson v. Board of Education referred to these 
issues as "establishment" concerns, ignoring their important 
role in protecting voluntary religious exercise.20g 
206. Tarr, supra note 6, at 77-78. 
207. Id. at 85-86. 
208. In addition to the "no compelled church attendance/support of minister" and 
"no-preference" language, most state constitutions were amended in the nineteenth 
century to bar the use of public funds for any religious institution, society, or 
school and to prevent the public schools from being used for sectarian purposes. 
This resulted from the anti-Catholic sentiment of the time and ensured the contin- 
ued Protestant hegemony. See Laycock, Summary, supra note 15, at 845; Tam, 
supra note 149, at 67-68. 
209. 330 U.S. 1 (1947). The Court wrote: 
The "establishment of religion clause* of the First Amendment means at  
least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a 
church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or 
prefer one religion over another. Neither can force nor influence a person 
to go to or to remain away from church against his will or force him to  
profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No person can be punished for 
entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church atten- 
dance or non-attendance. No tax in any amount, large or small, can be 
levied to support any religious activities or institutions, whatever they 
may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice 
religion. Neither a state nor the Federal Government can, openly or se- 
cretly, participate in the affairs of any religious organizations or groups 
and vice versa. In the words of Jefferson, the clause against establishment 
of religion by law was intended to erect "a wall of separation between 
church and State." 
Id. at 15-16 (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1879)). The 
Court captures these limits on state action under the "establishment" rubric since 
these were precisely the types of abuses of personal liberties caused by govern- 
ments that had an established church. But these are, at bottom, "free exercise" 
concerns. If I am compelled to pay for a church my free exercise has been bur- 
dened by the state's established religion because in the free exercise of my religion 
I may choose to support another church or no church at  all. The establishment is 
2751 STATE CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION 321 
The language of most state constitutions does not separate 
the establishment provisions from the freedom of worship, con- 
science, and religious exercise  provision^.^" For most, in fact, 
the provisions are so interconnected that to name some "estab- 
lishment" and others "free exercise" artificially divides unified 
concerns and imports the federal problem of the "tension be- 
tween the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses."211 Be- 
cause of the variety of textual sources for the protection of reli- 
gious exercise and for non-establishment, some states have not 
been overly concerned with categorizing a case under the label 
of "free exercise" or "establishment" so as to limit themselves to 
one or the other body of case law.212 Sometimes state courts 
even jump back and forth between the federal analysis of one 
concept and the state analysis of another.213 Precisely be- 
cause the texts of state constitutions weave together and over- 
lap their free exercise and establishment provisions (as opposed 
to creating neatly divided categories in theoretical tension with 
each other), a greater possibility exists for developing coherent 
and comprehensive religious liberty doctrines at the state level. 
Professor Tarr suggests that "given the greater specificity of 
state constitutional guarantees, such tensions [between estab- 
lishment and free exercise concepts] are less likely to arise. 
Certainly, they have not yet arisen . . . ."214 
The history of independent interpretation of state estab- 
lishment provisions suggests that the main prohibition is 
against institutional support or aid to religion.215 From this 
the state's action that burdens free exercise, but there is no "compelling state in- 
terest" to have an established church because the Establishment Clause has forbid- 
den it. 
210. See supra notes 206-207 and accompanying text. 
211. Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 720 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
212. See, e.g., Fox v. City of Los Angeles, 587 P.2d 663 (Cal. 1978) (holding 
cross on city hall unconstitutional under California Constitution, violating both the 
no-preference and establishment provisions). 
213. See, e.g., Heritage Village Church .& Missionary Fellowship, Inc. v. State, 
263 S.E.2d 726 (N.C. 1980), where the North Carolina Supreme Court applied the 
Federal Establishment Clause test because it read state freedom-of-conscience and 
no-religious-discrimination provisions together with federal establishment as 
" 'coalesding] into a singular guarantee of [the] . . . principle of separation of 
church and state.' " Id. at 730 (quoting Braswell v. Purser, 193 S.E.2d 90, 93 (N.C. 
1972). 
214. Tarr, supra note 6, at 78. 
215. After incorporation in the 1940s, and to the present, "some state courts 
followed the [U.S. Supreme Court's] results and reasoning in interpreting and ap- 
plying diverse state clauses. Others continued to issue independent interpretations 
and some rejected the Supreme Court's lead." FREISEN, supra note 45, 5 4.01. Pro- 
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institutional emphasis,'16 Professor Tarr concludes that gov- 
ernmental accommodation of religion is constitutional as long 
as it does not involve favoritism, monetary aid, or interference 
with religious freedom.217 Thus, at the state level, there is 
room for the development of a coherent understanding of man- 
visions regarding no compelled attendance or support of a church and no 
preference rarely serve' as the basis of stricter interpretation. In fact, states inter- 
preting the no-preference clauses typically find that they are either less strict than 
the federal standard or consistent with the federal analysis of the Everson-Lemon 
line of cases. See, e.g., Clayton v. Kervick, 267 A.2d 503, 506, 528 (N.J. 1970) 
("Our state provision is less pervasive, literally, than the federal provision. Hence 
our discussion will be limited to the federal provision as interpreted by the United 
States Supreme Court."), vacated, 403 U.S. 945 (1971); see also FREISEN, supra 
note 45, 5 4.03; Fritz, supra note 40, at 58-60 (indicating that in most cases the 
state equates federal and state provisions, despite differences in text, and therefore 
has same interpretation of no-preference clause as Establishment Clause in Federal 
Constitution). Some states have developed the no-preference doctrine into one of 
equal access to ensure that religious as well as secular groups are eligible for 
government aid generally available for public purposes. See, e.g., Fort Sanders 
Presbyterian Hosp. v. Health & Educ. Facilities Bd., 453 S.W.2d 771 (T~M. 1970) 
(finding the no-preference provision of the state constitution to mean that state aid 
to religiously affiliated institutions was constitutional when available on equal 
footing with secular and educational institutions as part of a general program 
fostering a public purpose). 
Specific no-aid provisions from the nineteenth century have been the source of 
most independent interpretation that goes beyond the federal interpretation to 
strike permissible accommodations of religion. See FREEEN, supra note 45, $ 4.05; 
Note, supra note 111, at 639-40. Of fifteen states interpreting these no-aid provi- 
sions, twelve have been interpreted more broadly than the Federal Establishment 
Clause. Id. a t  640. "These 'no aid' clauses are unique to state constitutions, and 
have frequently required invalidation of state financial aid programs that would be 
tolerated by the first amendment." FREISEN, supra note 45, 3 4.01. A Massachu- 
setts Supreme Judicial Court justice has gone so far as to assert that the "restric- 
tive impact of [the Massachusetts anti-aid provision] has rendered the federal anti- 
establishment provision relatively insignificant in certain respects." Wilkins, supra 
note 194, at  897. The no-aid provisions have therefore given the state courts the 
right to limit governmental accommodation of religion more severely than is re- 
quired at  the federal level. 
216. Professor Tarr indicates 
Early state constitutions did not seek to circumscribe the influence of reli- 
gion in society or to eliminate religious influence on government but rath- 
er to prevent governmental intrusion into the religious sphere . . . . State 
courts continued to recognize Christianity as part of the common law and 
to sustain convictions for blasphemy when speakers disparaged Christian 
beliefs . . . . Thus, state constitutions were interpreted so as to protect 
Christianity and to enforce the prevailing, Protestant consensus." 
Tarr, supra note 149, at 67. Constitutions were not neutral; they were very much 
in favor of religion as long as no preference was shown to a particular religious 
group, no money aid was given to any religious groups, and the recognition of 
religion did not interfere with anyone else's freedom of belief and worship. Id. at 
73. 
217. Tarr, supm note 6, at 105-06. 
2751 STATE CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION 323 
datory and permissible accommodations. Aggressive exemptions 
of religious practice, resulting from the use of a strict scrutiny 
review of laws burdening religion, are fully compatible with 
this institutional separation-both protect the i n t L ~ t y  of reli- 
g i ~ n . ~ l ~  
- 
A return to strict scrutiny a t  the state level is completely 
compatible not only with establishment provisions within state 
texts, but with the Free Exercise Clause and Establishment 
Clause of the First Amendment. Smith provides a low standard 
of review which the states are free to exceed with the use of 
their own strict scrutiny standard. The Federal Establishment 
Clause does not preclude this for several reasons. First, Smith 
itself retains strict scrutiny review for several categories of 
cases. Moreover, Smith did not overrule any earlier free exer- 
cise cases, and its adoption of a lower standard was not related 
to any developments in establishment jurisprudence. Second, 
religious exemptions have repeatedly been held constitution- 
a1219 and are clearly permissible when they are "designed to 
218. The f ad  that the opportunity for coherent jurisprudential development ex- 
ists does not mean it has been achieved. Washington's tradition of independence in 
the no-aid area and more recent independence in the free exercise area illustrate 
some inconsistencies. In Witters v. State, 689 P.2d 53 (Wash. 1984), the state high 
court refused to consider Larry Witters' study for the ministry religious exercise 
because it was not mandatory. The Washington Supreme Court held unconstitution- 
al, under the Federal Establishment Clause, the availability of public funding for 
Larry Witters, under a general program of funding education for the blind, because 
he planned to use the money to study for the ministry. The U.S. Supreme Court 
reversed, explaining that this particular form of aid was a permissible accommoda- 
tion. Witters v. Washington Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1985). But 
the Court refused to hold that the Federal Free Exercise Clause required the re- 
sult: 
On remand, the state court is of course free to consider the applicability 
of the "far stricter" dictates of the Washington State Constitution . . . . 
We decline [Witters'] invitation to leapfrog consideration of those issues 
by holding that the Free Exercise Clause requires Washington to extend 
vocational rehabilitation aid to [Witters] regardless of what the State 
Constitution commands. 
Id. a t  489 (citations omitted). Practically a t  the invitation of the U.S. Supreme 
Court, the Washington high court, on remand, reinstated its original holding, this 
time on the grounds that the aid was unconstitutional on state non-establishment 
grounds. 771 P.2d 1119, 1123 (Wash. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 850 (1989). This 
plainly contradicts the broad understanding of religious exercise in First Covenant 
Church v. City of Seattle, 787 P.2d 1352 (Wash. 1990), vacated, 111 S. Ct. 1097 
(1990). Definitional inconsistencies must be resolved or explained if the integrity of 
religious conduct is to find protection in state texts. 
219. Corporation of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987); Texas 
Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 18 n.8 (1989); Empioyment Div. v. Smith, 494 
U.S. 872 (1990). 
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alleviate governmental intrusions on [religious practices]."z20 
State court decisions to exempt religious behavior from general- 
ly applicable laws are, by definition, based upon a determina- 
tion that a burden on religious practice must be alleviated. If 
general legislative exemptions are welcomed in both Free Exer- 
cise and Establishment Clause jurisprudence without any spe- 
cific showing by religious claimants of a burden then all the 
more reason to welcome court-mandated exemptions issued 
after careful review of the burden and state interests a t  stake. 
Finally, the U.S. Supreme Court has never reversed a state 
supreme court for giving too much protection to religious exer- 
cise under its own constitution. In fact, the two occasions on 
which it has reversed state court decisions based on state con- 
stitutional interpretations have involved states which violated 
the First Amendment because they were trying to  avoid violat- 
ing state (and federal) establishment pro~isions.~~' 
States choosing to employ a strict scrutiny standard of 
review can serve to engender dialogue on the meaning of reli- 
gious liberty among state courts and between state and federal 
courts. But meaningful dialogue will require proponents of the 
non-relational and relational approaches to compromise on 
their methodology. State-first theorists should acknowledge the 
. damage Smith has caused and will continue to cause to  the free 
exercise of religion; they must be willing to look seriously at 
the gap in substantive protection that this decision has created 
at the federal level. Likewise, federal-first theorists should not 
underestimate the profound interpretive independence avail- 
able under state constitutions and the urgent need to mine 
those state constitutions as sources of rights in the post-Smith 
period. 
220. Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. at 18 n.8. See Michael W .  McCo~ell ,  Accommoda- 
tion of Religion: An Update and a Response to the Critics, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
685, 696-708 (1992). 
221. In McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978), the T e ~ e s s e e  Constitution dis- 
qualified ministers from legislative positions. The state legislature applied this 
provision to candidates for delegate to the T e ~ e s s e e  limited mnstitutional conven- 
tion in 1977 in a separate statute, "[alny citizen of the state who can qualify for 
membership in the House of Representatives . . . may become a candidate for 
delegate to the convention." Id. at 621. The Supreme Court held this attempt to 
ensure no state establishment violated the Free Exercise Clause. Similarly, Missou- 
ri argued in Widmar v. Vincent, 454 US. 263 (1981), that if the state university 
permited a religious group to meet on campus it would be violating the establish- ' 
ment provisions of the federal and state constitutions. The US. Supreme Court 
held that this violated federal free speech protections. Id. at 276-77. 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
Professor Emily Fowler Hartigan has written, 
[State constitutions are] being interpreted into being in fifty 
different states. The "new federalism" has an unpredictable 
reality, which does not neatly follow anyone's political agenda. 
It  has the means for authenticity; i t  practices the core virtue 
of American local government, participation. . . . We are tak- 
ing back our texts, living our laws. 
. . . .  
In our federal constitutional jurisprudence, we have 
forgotten what gives life to the reading of the text and the 
commentary on the text. . . . [But with state constitutions1 
new ways of talking and reclamation of fundamental law 
have loosed new streams of life-giving spirit to enflesh the 
"mere skeleton[sl" of the words of 
While it may be too soon to determine whether the emerg- 
ing post-Smith decisional law is an  authentic act of "taking 
back our texts," several themes-or at least their rough out- 
lines-emerge from it. The foregoing has shown how the free 
exercise texts in many state constitutions refer explicitly to 
multiple dimensions of religious exercise, explicitly limit the 
state's authority in the area of religious exercise, and explicitly 
acknowledge that the state is not the ultimate source of author- 
ity. By reclaiming those texts, state courts courageous enough 
to depart from Smith can provide robust protection for religious 
liberty through strict limits on the government's ability to in- 
terfere in religious exercise. What appear to be arising from 
this emerging state jurisprudence are a more authentic defini- 
tion of religious liberty, a more genuine application of the com- 
pelling interest standard, and new, clearer textual bases for the 
definition of a compelling state interest. Taken together, these 
factors may portend a new atmosphere of respect for religious 
liberty. 
- 
222. Hartigan, supra note 78, at 273-74 (footnotes omitted). 
